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ABSTRACT

Ghosts of Quebec spotlights the violence and killing in the Seven Years’
War and how it exemplifies a cycle of violence perpetuated by common soldiers.
In doing this, the main analysis of this essay includes modern research on violence
and killing as well as psychological combat trauma at the Siege of Quebec, 1759.
The present literature on the Seven Years’ War often assumes a top down approach
and emphasizes the roles of leaders and politicians without engaging the combat
experience of common soldiers. Research on the siege and battle for Quebec
follows a comparable methodology that leaves out the story of common soldiers
and analyzes the three-month siege in terms of tactics and strategy. Ghosts of
Quebec takes a socio-historical approach, applying the literature on killing and
psychological trauma in modern warfare to the primary documentation of British
soldiers at the siege of Quebec. This essay will fill the void in the historiography
of the Seven Years’ War and address the guerilla warfare waged by soldiers at
Quebec in 1759 as a part of a cycle of violence driven by psychological combat
trauma.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The British fleet under the watchful command of Rear-Admiral Philip Durell and General James
Wolfe set sail from Louisburg and reached the mouth of the St. Lawrence on June 9th, 1759. The
river was largely unexplored by British seamen of this time so it represented a new frontier of
warfare. Happening upon two French seamen, the British sought to abduct them to exploit their
knowledge of the waterway. These French seamen saw what they thought were French vessels
signaling them to board, but in fact, were decoyed on board the disguised enemy warships. The
pilots did not cooperate well with their British captors, however, one proclaiming that “Canada
should be the grave of the whole army, and he expected in a short time to see the walls
ornamented with English scalps.”1 After the British landed at Quebec this prophecy was made
true in a bitter, bloody and brutal series of events.
As the primary British landing force made their way onto the Isle d’Orleans through the
landing area at St. Laurent, a group encountered a grizzly message to the British as a whole. A
member of one of the ranging parties sent out by Wolfe on the 26th was used as a warning to the
British to cease their landings and return to where they came. Troops discovered this “Ranger
killed and scalped, and a stake drove through his body.”2 The French and their native allies
revealed themselves able and willing to use hyper-violence, guerilla tactics including scalping
and body mutilation, to repel the British from their lands. Such actions precipitated separate
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responses by British commanders and soldiers. British commanders condemned these attacks as
unjust and against European rules of war. However, soldiers took matters into their own hands
and fought the war on the same terms as those of the French and their native allies: scalping,
killing prisoners, and wreaking destruction.
The violence at Quebec represents a leitmotif of war found in the North American theatre
of the Seven Years’ War, a war that began in 1754 with the execution and scalping of a French
officer by a Native American accompanying the inexperienced British colonial officer George
Washington. Through the intervening years before Quebec, conflict escalated with the forced
evacuation of the Acadian people from Nova Scotia, massacres of surrendered British garrisons,
and the indiscriminate use of guerrilla warfare and the systematic targeting of civilians, making
this conflict one that fell outside the intentional norms of just war. In 1759 the Seven Years’
War had been in its third official year and the British fighting the French had no clear endgame
in sight. The British victory at Louisburg the previous year had opened up the doors for William
Pitt, the British secretary of state in charge of North America, to implement plans against French
Canada.3 At Quebec, however, combat took on a decidedly non-European cast, with acts of
guerilla violence breeding yet more violence in the conflict and, arguably, causing psychological
trauma to the soldiers who experienced in the North American approach.
The purpose of this essay is to shed light on violence and killing in the Seven Years’ War
and how it exemplifies a cycle of violence perpetuated by common soldiers. The mechanism
that will drive this essay forward is the bridge between modern analysis of killing and the 18th
century conflict known as the Seven Years’ War. A plethora of research exists on combat
trauma in 20th century conflicts, but most of the studies on killing and psychological combat
trauma assume it to be a modern phenomenon. Conversely, the literature on the Seven Years’
3
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War often assumes a top down approach and emphasizes the roles of leaders and politicians
without engaging the combat experience of common soldiers. Research on Quebec follows a
similar approach that leaves out the story of the rank-and-file and the trauma they experienced
from the style of warfare in which they engaged. The few sources that write on guerilla warfare
frame those smaller conflicts in terms of tactics rather than the details of human experience. To
fill this gap in the story, this essay will address the guerilla warfare waged by soldiers at Quebec
in 1759. It will take a socio-historical approach, applying the literature on killing and
psychological trauma in modern warfare to the primary documentation of British soldiers at the
siege of Quebec. Combined, the theory and research will help understand the nature of war in
North America in 1759—bloody guerilla conflict perpetuated by French, British and Native
combatants that spurred a cycle of violent revenge—as well as how the rank-and-file experience
shaped the war.
The Seven Years’ War in North America witnessed armed conflict that exceeded
European norms of violence, including widespread scalping and killing of unarmed prisoners,
which established a pattern of escalating violence that culminated at Quebec. This occurred in
response to French and Native American scalpings, mutilation, and dismemberment of British
prisoners throughout the war. At Quebec, Wolfe’s soldiers responded in kind to French
aggression, which prompted a cycle of violence between the two armies that peaked in late
August 1759 with the killing of French prisoners, including a priest. The violence indicated in
these sources and its cyclicality suggests that psychological combat trauma and Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) may have played a part in this conflict. Soldiers scarred by extreme
violence committed against themselves or their comrades turned the same methods onto their
enemies in attempts to assuage their grief and satisfy their thirst for vengeance. The siege and

3

battle for Quebec serves to illuminate that much of the Seven Years’ War was waged according
to cultural norms alien to Europeans; and, on the British side, that common soldiers, not
generals, were largely responsible for its brutal conduct.
Traditional military history tends to naturalize violence and avert its gaze from killing by
concentrating on names, dates and places rather than the details of battle. But killing, while
“natural” to war is unnatural to human beings. It requires training and disciplinary regimes to
coerce the soldier to take the life of an enemy. This does not, however, absolve them from
feeling guilt. The act of killing and violence in war has adverse emotional and physical effects on
human beings. The more people are exposed to violence and destruction, the more likely they
will become psychological casualties of war.4 Presenting violence and killing as an unnatural
part of human experience will allow for a clear understanding of the brutalization of conflict that
occurred in the Seven Years’ War. Given the nature of the violence, British soldiers must have
experienced some degree of combat trauma, which, in turn, created the circumstances for the
hyper-violence that occurred in the siege before the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.
This essay will document the cycle of violence that occurred during the Siege of Quebec
from May to September 1759. The Siege of Quebec witnessed many violent acts and traumatic
psychological episodes involving the British armed forces. In this instance, violence was
unbarred and civilians and soldiers alike, became targets for terror tactics, all part of a revenge
narrative precipitated by previous events in the war such as the killing of surrendered garrison
members at Fort Oswego (1756) and Fort William Henry (1757). The British considered both
incidents unbridled massacres performed by natives aligned with the French under the watchful
eye of French leadership. By isolating and documenting the violence that ensued during the
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siege of Quebec and applying modern studies of psychological combat trauma, the actions of
soldiers can be better understood as being personal, as much as military, in nature.
This paper will first outline the relevant historiography and address research on the
psychology of killing in war that will serve as the departure point. Following this section will be
a brief chronology of events in the Seven Years’ War leading up to the events at Quebec in 1759,
in particular episodes of the conflict that had significant impacts on the psyche of British
soldiers. An in-depth analysis of the siege of Quebec comprises the main body of this essay.
Within this section there will be an assessment of the violence at Quebec in light of
contemporary norms on the waging of just war and whether these tactics diverged from
acceptable contemporary practices. This essay will conclude that the cycle of violence that
culminated at Quebec in 1759 derived from a deep-seated desire for revenge rooted in
psychological trauma experienced by British soldiers. The siege and the war as a whole drew
from this bloody wellspring.

5

Chapter 2
Historiography
A number of survey monographs cover the Seven Years’ War as a whole. These share several
common features, in particular the adoption of a mostly top-down perspective of officers and
senior officials. Works by Fred Anderson, Daniel Baugh and William Fowler all fall into this
category.
Fred Anderson’s Crucible of War looks comprehensively at the Seven Years’ War.
Anderson concentrates on the nature of war in the Americas and how this set the tone for the rest
of the conflict on a global scale. He includes chapters on all the major incursions in the North
American theatre. A chapter on the Siege of Quebec appropriately titled “Dubious Battle”
contains elements that are missing from the discussions of others. He illustrates that the tactics
employed by British General James Wolfe rose to unprecedented levels of destruction of civilian
property, including atrocities such as mutilation, scalping, and general terror tactics employed in
the Quebec countryside.5 Anderson does a sufficient job in telling the story of the Seven Years’
War, and the chronology of the Siege of Quebec, but lacks analytical depth in describing how
soldiers and officers operated on an emotional level in the midst of the conflict. The violence
conducted by Wolfe and his soldiers is considered normal by Anderson, even though he
identifies the tactics as unusually savage for the time period.6 Anderson’s wide-ranging look at
the war is useful in establishing continuity and connecting the events of the war to each other and
how they ultimately led to the American Revolution, but the lack of detail on the specific events
at Quebec and other battles require supplemental sourcing. More centrally, countering his
normalization of violence at Quebec constitutes one objective of this study.
5
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The Global Seven Years’ War by Daniel Baugh fills in the blanks left by Anderson and
focuses much more on the war globally. In terms of the changing tide of war in the North
American front, Baugh pays particular attention to the role of the Atlantic Ocean. An emphasis
on naval power and overseas relationships on the workings of the war is evident throughout his
book. Baugh’s analysis of the capture of Quebec paints a comprehensive picture of the role of
the Royal Navy in the operation of the campaign. On this note, he provides a brief overview of
the Siege of Quebec, the health of General Wolfe and the state of the navy in terms of
involvement in this section of the campaign. However, he does not paint a picture of what the
soldiers, sailors, and officers felt or how they operated during this grisly siege. The tactics
employed by Wolfe are largely ignored including the intensive naval bombardment of the city,
which he states had no strategic purpose aside from demonstrating military superiority.7 This
work provides a view through the lens of the navy during the Siege of Quebec and the Seven
Years’ War and how naval power contributed to a British victory.
William Fowler’s piece Empires at War does exactly what the title suggests: it frames the
Seven Years’ War in terms of two early-modern empires fighting in what he calls the “first world
war.”8 Much like Anderson’s Crucible of War, Fowler places the importance of the Seven Years’
War on the operations by the French and British in North America. He does not provide the
level of detail on every event of the War that Anderson attempts to provide, but he describes the
cultural and political background of the war that made the conflict unique within the North
American theatre. Fowler portrays the struggle for the colonies of North America as the
beginnings of modern conflict and the importance of the fiscal-military state. Fowler emphasizes
the importance of economics to the Seven Years’ War and how British control of North America
7
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changed the nature of global trade.9 This source provides an economic perspective that
supplements the tactical aspects of Baugh and Anderson’s works.
To successfully outline the violence at Quebec, it is essential to examine the research on
the nature of armed conflict in North America the 17th and 18th centuries. Three main
perspectives of the conflict are evident: the warfare in North America followed a distinctly North
American way of war, to which European soldiers and colonists adapted; warfare followed the
military standards of Europe; last, warfare was a hybrid of European and North American
methods. The first position is staked out by John Grenier. His The First Way of War historicizes
the British tactics in the Seven Years’ War back to early European settlement. Grenier illustrates
that the adaptation of these tactics involved an exchange of warfare practices between native,
British and French peoples.10 Grenier’s perspective demonstrates that the Seven Years’ War
fought in North America formed part of a long history of warfare spawned in North America
using ranging tactics and guerilla tactics. Patrick Malone in The Skulking Way of War likewise
put forward a cultural assimilation model but provided more detail on the process of cultural
fusion within North America and how this affected the state of war during the colonial period.
Furthermore, he believes that this produced a uniquely American way of warfare that utilized
European technology.11 These differing perspectives are important to showcase the arguments
made about American style warfare and demonstrate the cultural, political, and technological
exchanges between Europeans and natives that ultimately affected warfare in the Seven Years’
War.

9

Fowler, Empires at War, 268-275.
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The cultural contact of Europeans and natives proved significant to warfare in North
America. However, Malone and Grenier do not provide the perspective of soldiers on a personal
level and how they adjusted to this type of war. European and American tactics and methods of
war all had their own unique effect on soldiers. John Ferling’s A Wilderness of Miseries
provides insight into the nature of warfare in the colonies and how it usually occurred on a
smaller scale than conflicts in Europe, but often produced more destruction. This text
emphasizes that Europeans had to adapt to and overcome the tactics of North America to gain
victory in their colonies.12 However, he supplements this discussion of North American warfare
to show how it actually affected common soldiers, the hardship and violence resulting in
desertions, massacres and plundering.13 The Quebec campaign of 1759 exemplifies the end
result of Euro-American adaption to the style of war found in North America. Daniel Beattie
demonstrates that European soldiers had to adapt their own technology and tactics to be relevant
and effective on the New World battlefield, not only because of cultural differences but also due
to environmental differences compared to battlefields in Europe.14
In contrast to the above sources on colonial warfare, Peter Russell and Guy Chet argue
that the Seven Years’ War in North America represents a triumph of European tactics and
warfare over the primitive style of warfare of the colonies. Russell attacks previous historical
representations of regular soldiers and officers as inexperienced with guerilla warfare. He
demonstrates that these soldiers in fact had ample experience with irregular tactics in both
Scotland and mainland Europe. The failures of European commanders and soldiers in North
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John Ferling, A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America (London: Greenwood Press, 1980),
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America did not derive from unfamiliarity and failure to adapt to local conditions, but rather,
their failures to apply the lessons learned in Europe to conflict in North America.15 Chet shows
that the tactics of European soldiers proved more effective than the way North American militia
and natives fought due to the refinements the regular made based on years of experience in
Europe and further afield. This in part had to do with superior technology but Chet prefers the
education and experience of European professional soldiers to that of Native Americans and
colonial militias.16 These perspectives favor European excellence over the perceived
primitiveness of American ways to wage war.
Armstrong Starkey’s European and Native American Warfare proposes that colonial
warfare resulted from a meld of North American and European warfare, adopting an ethnohistorical approach. Starkey dismisses the European versus North American way of war debate
as missing the point, instead affirming that these differing types of war happened hand in hand as
utilized by both the French and the British.17 This perspective will predominate in this essay.
Although, the North American front of the Seven Years’ War was quite different than the
battlefields of Europe, ultimately the critical moments were won by European standards, such as
the battle at the Plains of Abraham. But from the perspective of common soldiers, the hyperviolence of the North American way of war likely had more of an affect on a personal level.
The British and French military in North America during the Seven Years’ War were
comprised of two separate parts, not including native allies, the soldiers from mainland Europe
and those gathered from the colonies, both marked by distinct societal backgrounds. Provincial

15
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soldiers had various backgrounds depending on the colony of origin but proved to be unused to
the regimen of regular discipline and less likely to become professional soldiers.18 Stephen
Brummell views British regular soldiers as coming from the lower ranks of society.19 Peter Way
disagrees with Brummell, alleging that he falls into the trap of adopting the perspective of his
sources: British officers from the gentry. Way examines both regular and provincial soldiers.
Fort the former, he focuses on their class status and how force, either the explicit force of
impressment or the implicit force of economics, pushed men into the military. Of provincial
soldiers, he argues they exercised greater choice in enlistment and opted for colonial service with
its higher pay, shorter term, and more benign disciplinary system, yet found themselves
subjected to regular army officers.20 Despite these differences, both types of soldiers are drawn
into the web of hyper-violence in the Seven Years’ War.
Most sources agree on the harsh lifestyle and realities of serving in both the regular and
provincial forces during the colonial period. Titus outlines the disciplinary problems the
provincial armies faced and how this often translated into issues with desertion and basic
unruliness.21 However, Anderson posits that provincial soldiers had a relatively gradual
transition from civilian life to military life, although harsh discipline still arose in the provincial
forces, especially with their interactions with regular forces. Regular discipline, Anderson
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elaborates, reflected a rather British civilian law.22 The discipline capped an already harsh
military lifestyle. Brumwell’s chapter “Following the Drum” paints a picture of the cruelty that
was involved with being a part of the British army, but his portrayal gives the soldiers little
agency when explaining instances of mutiny, conflict with officers, or general disorder.23
The literature on military life in the colonial period provide their own perspectives on
combat and its effects. Anderson and Brumwell in their respected works indict the army as an
institution. Combat is not their primary focus. Anderson provides a chapter in A People’s Army
entitled “Battle and its Effects” in which he attempts to provide the provincial common soldiers’
perspectives on battle during the colonial period. He emphasizes the terror and destruction they
witnessed and how this destruction created “a common memory” among soldiers’ records.24
Both these sources, and most of the historiography on military life, while alluding to the violence
and terror, fail to address any psychological trauma soldiers may have experienced.
These historiographical shortcomings bleed into studies on specific encounters of the
Seven Years’ War. Betrayals by Ian Steele and Brumwell’s White Devil portray the battles at
Fort William Henry and St. Francis respectively. They each focus on the tactical and graphic
details of these encounters between the English and the French along with European interactions
with Native Americans. Steele illustrates how the perspective of the extant sources, being
overwhelming European in nature, can lead to misinterpretation and inaccurate portrayals of
history.25 Brumwell analyzes the St. Francis “massacre” with providing ample background on
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the key players, specifically Ranger Robert Rogers.26 The ways in which these texts set up key
battles and incursions with social, cultural and political backgrounds as well as ample primary
illustrations are successful on many fronts. However, they fail to provide a psychological
element to soldiers and their experiences with violence and killing. Furthermore, violence and
killing are treated as normal aspects of war and are not indicted in a historical or psychological
manner.
Two important works on the Siege and battle for Quebec address the violence and
destruction at Quebec. Canadian Historian C.P. Stacey’s work Quebec 1759 offers a
comprehensive look at the battle and siege that took place between the British and French forces
during the summer of 1759. His top down perspective on the battle falls in line with historical
work of Stacey’s time, but has elements that lead towards a more social historical approach.
Stacey’s fifth chapter specifically examines the “cruelty” and “destruction” wrought by Wolfe’s
forces in the Quebec region. He interestingly attributes the violence at Quebec to the historical
creation of an American type of warfare, but also due to the events that happened previous to the
Quebec campaign specifically the massacre of Fort William Henry. He demonstrates that
General Wolfe wished to repay the French for their actions in previous incursions of the war with
his own brand of hyper violence.27 This connection points to the brutalization of warfare found
in the conflict by linking Quebec with events like those at Oswego and Fort William Henry.
However, Stacey overplays the role of Wolfe and his commanders relative to his soldiers who
actually committed the violence and destruction.
Matthew Ward’s The Battle for Quebec 1759 takes a similar approach to Stacey, but
provides legal and international context to the actions during the siege. His chapter “The
26
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Distasteful War” illustrates Wolfe’s controversial commands to target civilians and enemy
combatants with tactics that even at the time would have been considered relatively harsh.
International law during the 1700s, while not as formalized as today, still bore weight with kings,
commanders, and politicians on both sides of the war. Ward identifies specific legal premises to
provide a measure for the actions of both the French and English during the Siege of Quebec. He
charts the steady increase of violence throughout the war in light of international accords.28 Such
attention to the legal and political merits of the Wolfe’s methods utilized at Quebec clouds the
issue, pushing the soldiers who carried out his orders to the periphery. The men, in many cases,
scalped natives and targeted civilians for their own reasons and Wolfe’s orders merely freed their
hands. Ward’s use of international law and military practice at the time is interesting, but his
reading is subject to interrogation. This essay will demonstrate that Wolfe and his soldiers were
essentially in the right with their use of violence and destruction in light of previous encounters
with the French and native allies prior to and during the siege of Quebec.
Ward’s book possesses many merits but he misses the mark in not engaging the conflict
on the ground with common soldiers, in particular the whirlwind of violence they encountered at
Quebec. Furthermore, both Stacey and Ward fail to explain why the British soldiers acted so
violently outside the then current norms of war. This essay will provide that depth by attaching
modern research on violence, psychological trauma, and PTSD to the Siege and Battle for
Quebec.
Current research on the Seven Years’ War more often than not leaves out the personal
combat experience of the common soldier, partially because of a lack of information but also
because of the difficulty in interpreting soldier’s thoughts and feelings from existing sources.
28
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Modern research on psychological trauma can be applied to the Seven Years’ War to shed light
on why soldiers killed and committed acts of violence, as well as to gauge the reactions soldiers
had to their experience. This understanding can help interpret instances of hyper-violence in the
Seven Years’ War, specifically that found during the Siege of Quebec in 1759. In terms of
research on psychological trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, two strands of research
apply to this study. First, sources on killing and what facilitates it in soldiers. Second, research
on the effects of psychological trauma and how it manifests in soldiers’ actions in and out of
battle.
Analysis of soldiers’ combat psychology most often involves 20th century conflicts.
Historians have long ignored the possibility that soldiers of pre-modern conflicts may have
experienced combat fatigue or other psychological trauma. However, human nature persists
across time, which begs the question if soldiers of 20th century soldiers can succumb to combat
trauma, why not soldiers fighting in the Seven Years’ War? This section will provide an
overview of modern analysis of combat trauma and fatigue to establish solid ground on which to
make an analysis of the Siege of Quebec in light of a brutalization of warfare in the Seven Years’
War. War psychology was established as a professional discipline during the First World War.
Treatments were often severe and unwelcome by patients. Insane asylums became the home of
choice designated by governments for returning soldiers who experienced symptoms of battle
fatigue or other war neuroses.29 Because the discipline of psychology started in the 20th century,
academics have avoided applying their findings and principles to earlier conflicts.
Military historians have tended to naturalize killing in warfare, seeing it as an inevitable
consequence of armed conflict that requires no further scrutiny. More recently, scholars
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investigating the subject argue that killing does not come naturally to humans and has
psychological consequences for those combatants entrusted with taking human life. A middle
ground exists between the military and psychological approaches where killing in combat and its
associated trauma can be explored. Dave Grossman states that armies have deployed tactics to
ensure soldiers kill despite their “innate human resistance towards killing one’s own species.”30
Based on 20th century wars, Grossman identifies various factors that facilitate killing, what types
of killings are harder to commit, and the effects killing has on soldiers afterwards. One
contributing factor to the ease of killing is the idea of “group absolution.” Where a group has a
central purpose of committing, whether a platoon or regiment, individuals can commit the “sin”
as an anonymous part of the group with less feelings of guilt.31 Along with the idea of “Group
Absolution,” Grossman states that authority figures like officers play a big role in fostering
killing and the escalation of violence. Authority figures that demand violence and killing use
their influence to sway soldiers into carrying their orders out to their fullest extent.32 Although
Grossman argues that killing is not natural, his study often proves it to be all too natural to war
and the human condition. Although soldiers are the ones affected by PTSD and combat trauma,
their leaders motivate by fear, encouragement and reward for carrying out violent acts in war.
Grossman attributes atrocity in war to soldiers’ sense of the righteousness of their actions, a
belief fostered by the military leadership as issued in orders, as well as to previous atrocities
committed by the enemy.33
Soldiers for the most part experience some sort of guilt from their experience in combat.
Grossman demonstrates this with experiences ranging from the Napoleonic wars to the modern
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Vietnam conflict. The burden is dealt with in a number of different ways in order for soldiers to
cope with killing during their constant exposure to conflict.34 Soldiers kill for revenge, under
orders, and for survival under the most extreme circumstances. Grossman states that “the soldier
is a product of his environment, and violence can beget violence.” This is the case for 98 percent
of populations. However, in the two percent Grossman separates, these individuals enjoy
killing.35 In essence, Grossman wishes to demonstrate that violence and killing is not natural to
human beings. However, examining humanity’s track record with war and violence, this thesis
often misses its mark.
The brutalization of war stems from the adverse effects of killing on soldiers in combat.
Massacres, the unjust killing of prisoners, and terror tactics do not arise randomly or by
coincidence but derive from human experience. In Vietnam War veterans the urge to kill and to
brutalize the enemy often derived from losses suffered in guerilla warfare, but could persist into
civilian life.36 Shay similarly attested to the hyper vigilance and proneness to unnecessary
violence in combat veterans. The constant threats of being attacked by the enemy and being
betrayed by their own officers often led to such feelings.37
In Psychotherapy of the Combat Veteran, Harvey J. Schwartz examines the causes and
effects of PTSD on Vietnam War veterans as well as how it can be treated.38 Although treatment
for PTSD and combat trauma is not germane to this study, the causes of trauma and how they
manifest in these soldiers are. Some of his patients displayed tendencies towards violence and
had an urge to express these tendencies through violent action, which Schwartz directly related
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to their experiences in war.39 However, Schwartz fails to provide the mechanisms of combat
trauma, he displays the effects on human behavior and how some people can turn to violence as
an outlet of this trauma. Schwartz views this behavior as indicative of combat-induced severe
paranoia.40 Furthermore, Richard Cornfield provides an overview of traumatic neuroses and
signifying features of PTSD: chronic irritability and explosively violent reactions.41 These
findings can be applied to soldiers by examining incidents of violence and determining whether
these acts can be linked to previous enemy aggressions in campaigns, which would suggest that
combat trauma played a part in the violence.
Jonathan Shay argues that moral order or “Themis” hangs on a balance of a
commander’s abilities and what soldiers witness on the battlefield. Shay sums up these aspects
as the amenities that allow for massacre to occur in war. Shay equates Themis with a moral code
of “what’s right” in war at the time. Leaders betraying their soldiers by acting in a rash manner
or giving orders leading to unnecessary casualties offended this normative view, resulting in loss
of moral order.42 The absence of moral order paired to the psychological trauma experienced in
combat contributed to hyper-violence among soldiers. Essentially, moral order is lost, violence
increases, and trauma ensues, with the cycle repeating. Shay writes of the berserker state
observed in the Vietnam War, which drove soldiers to perform terrible feats in battle. A soldier
suffers from traumatic events and sometime after unleashes furious violence on the enemy. This
often happens where vengeance is sought for lost comrades or as punishment for previous enemy
actions in war. A berserk soldier experienced a total loss of morality, where killing and violence
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became an outlet to relieve the pressures of war.43 This phenomenon can result in a cyclical
escalation of violence.
Being exposed to extreme violence and killing costs the psyche of any human a
substantial price. The critical text in understanding any kind of psychological disorder is the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American
Psychological Association. The DSM outlines the exact criteria for Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and how it manifests itself in people. First and foremost, “the person who is
experiencing PTSD has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience
and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone.”44 The experiences of war in general
almost always fall into these criteria. But the most important aspects of PTSD to this study are
its role in perpetuating violence. PTSD sometimes manifest in the hyper-vigilance of the
individual and his or her lashing out violently to any provocation.45 Soldiers in the Siege of
Quebec saw scalpings, the burning of villages, and violent skirmishes that all potentially
contributed to PTSD among combatants, markedly adding to the violence as the campaign
continued.
Emily Ozer and Daniel Weiss discuss the vague aspects of the DSM’s definition of the
initial cause of PTSD. The initial traumatic event happens, but the DSM does not go into
explaining the biological and psychological functions that give rise to PTSD. Furthermore, they
address the issue where PTSD affects some people by “traumatic events” but not others. On this
note, Ozer and Weiss stress that the “traumatic event” must be out of the norm of regular daily
activities and there must be a biological “arousal” of feeling and hormones that serve as the
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precursor to the symptoms of PTSD.46 This source provides extra depth to the DSM definition.
Situations of day-to-day violence when on campaign or soldiers serving in long-term sieges
experience the type of traumatic events that cause psychological trauma. This includes all types
of warfare, but specifically close guerilla warfare and hand-to-hand combat.
The historiography on the Seven Years’ War and the Siege and battle for Quebec in 1759
is largely missing a discussion on the psychological consequences of witnessing and taking part
in violence. Sources like Shay, Grossman and Schwartz all illustrate that PTSD and combat
trauma have symptoms that manifest in actions of extreme violence. Furthermore, studies on the
Seven Years’ War often naturalize violence in combat, taking it at face value from their sources.
This can be problematic and misses the human experience. All of these studies can be applied to
the Siege of Quebec to demonstrate that soldiers who fought there may have in fact suffered
from what now is known as PTSD or other psychological ailments in the same way modern
soldiers had been affected. Grossman’s study on killing and violence in war demonstrates a
number of details that apply directly to the siege of Quebec. The way in which soldiers react to
violence, the important role of authority figures, and the nature of the violence can shed light on
how soldiers may have dealt with the situation at the siege of Quebec. Second, sources on PTSD
and combat trauma like Shay, Schwartz and the DSM-IV show exactly what happens from
combat and what the symptoms look like in soldiers. Importantly, soldiers at Quebec exhibited
both the symptoms of hyper-vigilance and violent behavior. This can cause soldiers to act out in
an irrational manner, often contrary to their normal levels of violence in conflict. Such was the
case at Quebec as the siege progressed from British landings in June 1759 to their final
confrontation with the French on the Plains of Abraham in September.
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Chapter 3
Leading up to Quebec
The Seven Years’ War, by many accounts, is considered to be one of the first world scale wars.
It involved action in the Old World of Europe, in European colonies of North America and the
Caribbean, as well as in Africa and Asia. This essay focuses on the North American front of the
war involving the British, French and their corresponding Native allies. Incidents occurring early
in the war set in motion a cycle of violence that prepared British soldiers to engage in a
campaign of hyper-violence with French troops and their native allies during the siege of Quebec
in 1759.
The origin of the conflict had much to do with the expanding global presence of
European empires for land and resources. Both Daniel Baugh and Fred Anderson explain that
the origins of the Seven Years’ War lie within the conclusion of the previous conflict between
France and Britain in 1748. The balance of power in North America, according to Anderson,
was held between the Tripartite Agreement between the Iroquois Confederacy, the British, and
the French empires. However, at this time the expansion of settlements into the frontier and the
weakening of native powers left a power void in North America.47 A critical aspect of the
escalation of conflict in the 1750s was the expansion of trade into the Ohio Valley. Both French
and British traders looking to expand their colonial and economic influence in the region
contested regularly for control. Small conflicts arose between these traders over economic
competition, which resulted in many deaths of civilian traders. Subsequently, this encouraged a
French military presence in the Ohio valley.48 The type of warfare seen in these conflicts
between the French, British, and natives included many of bloody tactics to be seen at Quebec,
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1759, such as scalping and the killing of noncombatants.49 Violence between the French and the
English was nothing new to the world at this time, but examining the nature of this violence and
how it evolved is important to this study. How did the cycle of violence unwind and to what
purpose?
The penetration of British settlers and traders into the Ohio Valley threatened French
claims on the area. This forced the hand of Quebec and Versailles to take direct action in
preventing this expansion of control. French soldiers proceeded to occupy the region and
establish forts.50 In light of this expanded military presence, the conflict took a turn for the worst
as a result of the actions of an inexperienced colonial officer. This first major event of the
conflict happened in 1754, some two years before the Declaration of War between France and
Britain. Alarmed by news of the building of French Fort Duquesne at the present-day location of
Pittsburgh, Virginia dispatched the young officer George Washington to protect British interests
in the Ohio Valley. Governor Robert Dinwiddie instructed him to “act on the [defensive], but in
Case any Attempts are made to obstruct the works or interrupt our Settlements by any persons
whatsoever, You are to restrain all such Offenders, & in case of resistance to make prisoners of
or kill & destroy them.”51 These orders enabled a drastic escalation of conflict in the North
American frontier. Groups of soldiers were no longer stationed to defend colonial stakes, but to
seek out French and Native infiltrators and destroy them if necessary.
During the spring of 1754, at the time Dinwiddie issued his orders, a French officer,
Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville, was sent out to gather intelligence on Washington’s party.
These two opposing forces engaged one another in a time of political peace, concluding with
Washington’s party defeating that of Jumonville. Following this defeat, Washington took
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Jumonville prisoner and allowed his native companion Tanacharison to kill him despite being a
disarmed prisoner.52 However, Washington had attacked the French forces in an arguably
unprovoked manner allowing his allied Natives to scalp and desecrate the corpses of the French
soldiers.53 Washington, following this event, was forced by pursuing French forces to retreat to
Fort Necessity. A larger French force consisting of Native soldiers surrounded Washington’s
garrison. They feared the worst from French revenge and surrendered to prevent a massacre.54
This heinous act of war by the soldiers and natives under Washington as well as the French
attacks at Oswego and Fort William Henry in ensuing years set the precedent for the level of
violence to be expected in this conflict, setting in motion a series of leading directly to the Siege
of Quebec.
The manner in which the Seven Years’ War was fought in European differed
significantly from that in North America, where scalping, and the killing of non-combatants or
prisoners proved commonplace. Colonial officials and colonial soldiers ignored contemporary
rules of war so as to combat Native attacks. Grenier states that during the 1600s, colonies turned
to an “extirpative war” which consisted of “unlimited warfare” including civilian casualties,
civilian crops being destroyed and the destruction of civilian property.55 This specifically North
American type of war escalated from the killing of Jumonville.
The Sieges of Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry had a significant impact on both the
way the British soldiers saw the war and the political atmosphere surrounding the war. The fall
of Fort Oswego in 1756 exemplified to the British the violent measures the French and their
allies were prepared to take. The French took the fort with relative ease, promising the garrison
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safe conducts. French irregulars and natives, however, proceeded to kill, scalp, and plunder the
surrendered British soldiers, wounded, and civilians. Not all involved were killed, and the
remaining were taken prisoner by the French.56 This was the largest group of British prisoners
taken by the French at this time. Although Oswego was not as large of a military loss as Fort
William Henry was a year later, but the killing offered the British fodder for propaganda
characterizing the French and their native allies as cruel and barbaric.57 The reports of this
massacre at Oswego were greatly exaggerated, with “embellished” tales being passed throughout
British channels causing fear and havoc among frontier settlements.58 However, British
perception of these attacks is important to understanding the spread of fear and hatred towards
the French and their Native allies. A letter between British lords reports that “the whole garrison
was put to the sword, and the dead bodies of our countrymen denied even the sacred rite of
sepulture.”59 The theme of French perfidy grew over the war.
The infamous fall of Fort William Henry further exemplifies the ever-present potential
for violence in the alliance between the French and native peoples. Fort William Henry was
defeated with relative ease. The French lay siege to the fort and within days the British had
surrendered. The British were allowed an honorable retreat to Fort Edward with full military
honours based on their gallant efforts in defending the fort. Natives entered the fort and killed
the remaining wounded soldiers. They then followed the British retreat to Fort Edward, attacking
men, women and children, who were either taken captive or scalped to Montcalm’s dismay. A
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French missionary, Pere Roubaud, witnessed a native warrior having “carried in his hand a
human head, from which trickled streams of blood, and which he displayed as the most splendid
prize that he could have secured.”60 British accounts pointed to the French failure to insure the
articles of surrender.61 One source not present at the event, reported in his journal based on
correspondences he received days after the attack and by examining the ruins of the fort, where
he found bodies “barbarously murdered.”62 Officers were stripped of their clothing and scalped
alive on their retreat to Fort Edward. Natives “ravaged women and children” while being a
constant nuisance to the retreating British forces.63 In addition to officers and British subjects,
British aligned Natives and “negroes” were also subjected to the wrath of native looters. A
“negro” was burned alive according to Joseph Frye who was present at the Siege and surrender.
Frye insisted that British officers and soldiers plead for protection from Natives, but were
refused on all accounts.64 The French were perceived to be in control of their native allies and
allowed them to their own devices. Whether this was true or not, the fact of the matter is that
they were perceived to allow massacre to ensue. A civilian among the retreating forces recalls
natives that “drank the blood of their victims as it flowed from fatal wound(s).” This all
occurred as what he describes as 10,000 French soldiers standing idle in witness.65
The British viewed this “massacre” at Fort William Henry as a purposeful neglect of the
articles of surrender. Montcalm during the siege had threatened to allow his native allies to
60

Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the “Massacre,” 109-111.
Seth Metcalf, Diary and Journal of Seth Metcalf (Boston: The Historical Records Survey, 1939), 10; James
Furnis, “An Eyewitness Account by James Furnis of the Surrender of Fort William Henry, August 1757,” ed.
William S. Ewing, New York History 42, no. 3 (July 1961): 312-13; Rufus Putnam, Journal of Gen. Rufus Putnam:
Kept in Northern New York during Four Campaigns of the Old French and Indian War (Albany: Joel Munsell’s
Sons, 1886), 41.
62
Rufus Putnam, Journal of Gen. Rufus Putnam: Kept in Northern New York during Four Campaigns of the Old
French and Indian War (Albant: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1886) 46.
63
Metcalf, Diary and Journal of Seth Metcalf, 10.
64
Joseph Frye, “Joseph Frye’s Journal and Map of the Siege of Fort William Henry,” ed. James L. Kouchan, The
Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 15, no. 5 (1993): 356.
65
Anonymous, “An Account of the Massacre at Fort William-Henry in 1757. From Carver’s Travels,” in The Rural
Magazine (May 1, 1795), American Periodicals, 3.
61

25

wreak havoc on the Fort if they continued to resist. However, once the British Fort capitulated
Montcalm, according to his journals, pled to Native elders to curb their warriors from their usual
methods.66 According to these journals, Montcalm was not the butcher British sources claimed
him to be, but subject to a difficult relationship with his native allies he had to depend on.
British sources clearly show the French in a negative light. Steele argues this has led to a
distortion of events at William Henry. Nonetheless, this misperception fed British attitudes of
French and Indian cruelty that informed the violence at the Siege of Quebec.
These disasters encouraged the British military to meet the French with more violent acts
as the tide of war turned in their favor. Restorative violence was the name of the game for the
British in the events following the fall of Fort William Henry. A pamphlet published in 1761
illustrates this sentiment. “The Cruel Massacre of the Protestants, in North America” maintains
that the French and their native allies condoned and openly used scalping and attacks on
civilians. The pamphlet exclaims that natives “revenge themselves of the English; therefore they
have no mercy to man, women or child, but put all to the sword … killing and scalping them,
fleaing the skin and hair from their head, and every one of these they carry to the French, they
give them as a reward 40 shillings a piece.”67 The British believed that the French harnessed
their native allies to terrorize the British into submission. Propaganda of this temper inflamed
British passions against the French.
The French had won a number of victories against the British with the taking of Fort
William Henry, Fort Oswego and sustained a guerilla war against British North America.
Massacre and extreme violence was the common denominator of tactics among the belligerent
powers present in North America. The forts taken were pillaged and leveled by the French
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forces and their Native allies. Prisoners, non-combatants and surrendered soldiers were all
subject to the full force of native tactics. These people were kidnapped, scalped and murdered in
cold blood by what would seem unified French-Indian combatants.68 Although British soldiers
and civilians probably embellished some of these reports, their impact on British perception
should not be undervalued to the siege and battle for Quebec.
The French actively employed what was considered irregular tactics and soldiers during
their campaigns during the Seven Years’ War in North America. Furthermore, their allied
Natives and irregular soldiers preferred to utilize guerilla tactics to terrorize and demoralize
British soldiers and civilians. Over one hundred years of cultural hybridization of fighting
tactics in North America informed combat during the Seven Years’ War. Native groups did not
fight their intertribal conflicts in the same manner in which nation states fought in Europe.
Natives chose to fight under the cover of night or during the early hours of the morning.
Furthermore, they avoided head on confrontations and favoured a “skulking” type of warfare.69
Skulking warfare would certainly have been a terrifying encounter for British soldiers and
civilians. An account described native warfare as “so many [mischiefs] in a secret sly, skulking
way, no man knew well how to find them.” This “skulking” often concluded in brutal killings,
the desecration of bodies and the scalping of soldiers and civilians alike.70 Europeans who
landed in North America and came into conflict with native groups had to adapt, culminating in
the Seven Years’ War where Europeans willfully adopted these tactics.
To understand the British adoption of similar violent measures following 1757, it is
important to first understand the key military groups undertaking this violence: rangers and
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Highlanders. Natives were seen as savages and the British felt the need to employ “savage
tactics” to defeat them. The British had a hard time procuring native allies as well as employing
them as successfully as the French. Colonial rangers, seen by many as the answer to this
predicament, saw action in much of the war. Developing rangers was an idea that began in the
late 1600s in order to protect colonies and colonial investments from native attacks. Highly
mobile Native forces often defeated a militia commander Benjamin Church during this time
period with “skulking” tactics. Church protested that they “must make business of the war as the
enemy did.”71 The first ranger units resulted. During the Seven Years’ War, the British
employed rangers for what modern tacticians would considered to be special operations or covert
affairs. They took war and violence to the natives and the French by attacking combatants and
civilians with what the French called petite guerre, in modern terminology guerilla warfare.
They raided Native villages and defended the outer edges of the frontier. They were well liked
among British provincial forces but not well understood by the British regular army.72 Despite
this mistrust or misunderstanding, the British army was forced to utilize the skills of the rangers
due to French success in the first half of the war such as Braddock’s defeat on the
Monongahela.73 To fight this kind of war, the British had to fully embrace petite guerre
themselves and utilize to the fullest their own rangers. Despite issues with contrasting ideals of
discipline between the provincial rangers and British regular army, they proved to be useful in
doing the “distasteful work” regular in which troops and officers did not wish to participate. At
the sieges of Louisburg and Quebec rangers would terrorize French subjects and wreak havoc on
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the countryside in attempts to force surrender.74 However, the British army desired a force more
subject to its control whilst still being capable of such violence.
Scottish Highlanders had a long history of rebellion against both the British and their
lowland counterparts. They had a culture that the English-speaking world did not understand but
perceived as barbaric and warlike in nature. Highlander soldiers had a long history of serving as
mercenaries, fighting on all sides of the Thirty Years’ War for example.75 Although respected as
warriors and feared as a rebellious element to British supremacy, this did earn them the mantle of
a civilized people by their English overlords.76 The Highlands must also be considered a
separate part of Scotland, despite often being grouped in with the people of the Lowlands. Their
history and cultural structure often mirrors that of native groups in North America. They both
had clan systems of family; both were misunderstood groups on the periphery, and the British
considered both ferocious savages.77 Importantly, their history rivaling the British and their
perceived savagery set the tone for their importance in fighting for the British in the Seven
Years’ War.
Highlanders took to violence for restorative means. They were seen as vengeful in the
name of justice to whatever offended them or caused them wrongdoing.78 The Jacobite
Rebellion of 1745-46 hardened the savage image of the Highlanders in British minds. The
highlanders used irregular methods in waging war reminiscent of native tactics in North
America. British officers often viewed them with disdain and scorn, but also recognized that
they were the perfect balance to the “savagery” of natives in the New World. General Wolfe
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recognized their use in his campaigns because of their abilities to fight on the same level of
violence and irregularity as French Canadian natives.79 They served essentially as British shock
troops alongside the attacks headed by the Rangers. The British expected them to fight with
ferocity and strike fear into the enemy. The main advantage to using Highlanders in battle was
they were considered lesser humans and more expendable compared to regular British soldiers.
The casualty rate for Anglo-American soldiers at the end of the Seven Years’ War was nine
percent, for the Highlanders thirty-two percent.80 Ticonderoga, Louisburg and Quebec all dealt
the highlanders significant losses, whetting their appetite for further violence.
The battle of Carillon (or the battle for Ticonderoga) in July 1758 was the worst defeat
the British forces endured during the Seven Years’ War. The battle was an embarrassing attempt
by the British to turn the tide of war and take the offensive against the French. General
Abercrombie commanded the British forces against this strategic fort not far from the ashes of
Fort William Henry in hopes to turn the tide of war against the French.81 In the preceding
wintde, an advanced force of rangers commanded by Robert Rogers was overwhelmed by French
and native irregulars. Half of Rogers’ force was eliminated on this simple scouting mission,
including an officer and his accompanying party who were surrounded by the French and forced
to surrender. In naive hopes of fair treatment, these soldiers were tied up to trees and “hewn to
pieces.”82 The rangers would not forget this violence as the tide of war turned in favor of the
British.
Despite what the British learned about waging a traditional European war in North
America, General Abercrombie was set on taking Fort Carillon with a head on assault. The
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French abandoned their fort, destroying it and establishing an “abatis” of fallen trees and
obstacles on the high ground just outside of Fort Carillon. Abercrombie, ordered soldiers
without the cover of artillery, to storm the abatis to find a well-armed and prepared French
army.83 This proved to be a grave and horrific mistake for British soldiers. David Perry, a
provincial soldier at the time, described the ground as scattered with the bodies of his comrades,
dismembered, dead, screaming in pain or some combination of all three. He took cover behind a
stump, affirming: “A man could not stand erect without being hit, any more than he could stand
out in a shower, without having drops of rain fall upon him.”84
British Highlanders were the only units to scale the French abatis and engage the French
with every means they had available to them, firearm, sword, and bayonet. Lieutenant Colonel
Archelaus Fuller, a member of the provincial soldiers at Carillon, remembers the sight of
soldier’s limbs being blown off in their attempt to take French positions. As fast as soldiers got
up the defenses they were taken down by small arms fire.85 They fought with the ferocity that
gave them their warlike reputation across Europe. However, this viciousness could not turn the
tide in favor of the British once more. The highlander regiments suffered the worst casualties of
the battle for Ticonderoga. They were the last to be informed about a retreat and paid dearly for
this. Half of the highlanders who participated lost their lives during this incident. This half was
lost in a bloody firefight that would be forever imprinted on the people who survived.86 An
embarrassing loss for the British, this battle cost over five hundred British soldiers killed and
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1,500 wounded compared to less than 200 French officers and men killed or wounded.87 The
British army and leadership needed a win to overcome this horrific loss of life and spirit. The
coastal fortress of the French king’s namesake, Louisburg, proved to be a bloody triumph for the
British.
In 1758, Louisburg became the prime objective of William Pitt, who dispatched a force
of 14,000 men, mostly British regular troops to the fortress on Cape Breton Island.88 General
Jeffery Amherst was in charge of this reputable force with his Brigadiers General Edward
Whitmore, Wolfe and Charles Lawrence to direct operations on the line of battle and Admiral
Edward Boscawen to direct naval operations.89 General Wolfe was the first to successfully land
out of the 300 boats crammed with 10,000 troops. Miraculously, a boat of his Highlanders saw
an opening with cover to shelter a landing which allowed for the British mount what seemed on
the surface to be a typical European styled siege.90 The Highlanders had suffered again in this
landing, however. James Thompson, who would also be at Quebec, elaborated on his comrades
being killed by artillery and gunfire at the landing, as well as suffering the bloody tactics French
natives used against their enemies thereafter.91
General Wolfe and Amherst understood that corrective action needed to be taken against
the French for the massacres at Oswego and Fort William Henry. Furthermore, Wolfe in a letter
to Sackville before Siege states that the soldiers “are irritated against the enemy and have a
quarrel of their own to decide besides public cause.”92 British Generals had their mission to win
the war, but the soldiers had their own personal missions of revenge and bloodlust, although
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some generals were not completely above the sentiments of their soldiers. Amherst makes
mention that native tactics were “not war, but murder.”93 Wolfe capitalized on the disdain for
French Canadian and native soldiers with an interesting episode during the siege. A large bodied
native gunman was found shot in the groin. Wolfe amused by this ordered the native’s body to
be taken up to camp and strung up on display like wild game.94 Actions such as this would have
fed into British hatred for natives as well as encouraged more violent action.
The events at Fort William Henry and Oswego would have been common knowledge to
many soldiers and officers alike during the Louisburg campaign. Pamphlets and propaganda
readily prepared British soldiers for the tactics of the French and natives. One example
published later on in the war warns British subjects of the “heathen” natives and how they will
“come killing and scalping them, fleaing the skin and hair from their head.”95 British soldiers
responded to the French and their native allies in kind with their own brand of violence.
As the 300 landing ships inched towards the shoreline of Louisburg, soldiers experienced
heavy fire, the swell of the ocean and the grim possibility of a painful death at the hands of
musket fire, artillery or bladed weapons. Grenadiers, Highlanders and Light Infantry units
engaged the French and rushed their positions. They endured constant attacks from lurking
Canadians and Indians throughout the campaign.96 The attack resulted in a typical European
styled siege including entrenchments and bombardments on the fortress.97 Violent actions
peppered throughout this siege with Highlanders countering in kind the violence of the French
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and natives. Admiral Boscowen’s slave98 bore witness to the brutality of the Highlander
regiments, stateing that he held in his hand the scalp of a native king who was allied with the
French at Louisbourg. The highlanders took credit for this kill and kept this scalp with its
ornamental headdress as a trophy of their vengeance.99 A merchant corroborated this story
adding that the highlanders not only scalped, but also decapitated many enemy.100 This scene
would have been reminiscent of the defeat of Fort William Henry, but the difference being the
Highlanders were not motivated by scalp bounties or looting. Furthermore, important to note is
the fact that Highlanders were new to North America and quickly adopted North American
tactics and methods to fighting the French and their Native allies.
The British gave no quarter to anyone resisting their invasion of Louisburg in 1758.
After their musket and pistols were discharged at the enemy, soldiers were expected to engage
the enemy with hand weapons, which would have proven to be a bloody, brutal scene.101 David
Gordon, who was present at the events of Louisburg, specifically notes that they sought to punish
the French for their deeds in previous encounters and avenge the people of Fort William Henry
with a no mercy policy.102
Amherst and Wolfe knew the accepted levels of violence in an honorable war and
officially would have condemned practices such as scalping and beheading. However there is a
departure from these policies that fall in line with their soldier’s lust for revenge. Wolfe in a
letter to Sackville at the end of July admits that his soldiers were practicing scalping and
“behaved with distinction” while doing do. He admits that it would be his “pleasure to see the
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Canadian vermin sacked and pillaged and justly repaid for their unheard of cruelty.”103 British
soldiers repaid this “cruelty” in part at Louisburg, but still felt there was a debt outstanding.
Louisburg flew the white flag of surrender and requested they would be able to receive
the articles of surrender. Amherst responded in a short message stating the only terms of
capitulation would be their complete surrender. All people who took up arms against the British
were taken prisoner and sent back to Britain. Women, children and civilians living in and around
Louisburg were shipped back to France.104 The Acadians on the Ile St Jean were rounded up and
sent to France along with their brethren from Louisburg.105 Furthermore, the Mi’kmaq and
Abenaki tribes who assisted the French were hunted down and killed by the British. Wolfe
approvingly mentioned that they were a dastardly set of bloody rascals” and allowed his soldiers
to “cut them to pieces whenever we found them, in return for a thousand acts of cruelty and
barbarity.”106 This move by Amherst and Wolfe was the new policy towards the French in light
of their antics at Fort William Henry and Oswego. They were not allowed the honors of
surrender because British leadership and the public behind deemed them not deserving.
From this point on, the door was opened for the British to make their move to Quebec.
The progressively increasing violence of the encounters of the Seven Years’ War up to this point
are important in understand the violence that followed in Quebec and also to understand why this
violence occurred. The British mounted their expedition against the heart of French Canada a
year after the Louisbourg expedition. This attack on Quebec will serve as the core of this essays
attempt to document and illuminate the violence in the North American front of the Seven Years’
War as well as provide illustration to psychological trauma of soldiers and armies in this war.
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Chapter 4
Quebec 1759
The story of British victory at Quebec was riddled with hyper-violence marking the culmination
of the brutalization of warfare that began with the attacks at Oswego and Fort William Henry in
the years prior. Contrary to most depictions of this battle, this paper focuses on the experience of
British soldiers with guerilla warfare at Quebec. Officers like Wolfe and his brigadiers would
have been privy to the violence during the siege of Quebec, but their soldiers lived it every day
with constant native and French attacks, which they met with their own reprisals.
Collective memories of previous battles in North America, as well as the massacres that
occurred, are essential in understanding the violence of the siege of Quebec in 1759. British
soldiers, for the most part not new to the horrors of war, either had direct experience with French
and native tactics or had heard of them from comrades. The testimonies from these officers and
soldiers of their experiences informed the knowledge of the eight thousand British soldiers that
landed on Quebec to take the fortress city from the French. The introduction of this essay
outlined the story of the British journey down the St. Lawrence This chapter will evaluate the
incidents that occurred directly after the landings from the point in which the British saw their
deceased comrade impaled on a stake.
The British had Quebec as the main objective of their campaign in North America since
before the siege of Louisburg in 1758. This city held a strategic value for taking New France as
well as a symbolic value, demoralizing New France into surrender. William Pitt had intended on
sweeping through North America and taking Quebec in 1758, but the length of time required to
take Louisbourg and the failure at Carillon prevented this undertaking. Pitt in 1759 intended to
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finish this objective and capture the city by means of an invasion of the St Lawrence.107 James
Wolfe, a hero at Louisbourg, was entrusted with the campaign against Quebec. Wolfe would
take an underwhelming army of 8,000 troops in a fleet commanded by Admiral Charles
Saunders.108 Brigadier generals Robert Monkton, James Murray, and George Townshend
seconded Wolfe. These generals commanded a force that had four years of experience fighting
the French and their Indian allies in North America. The army consisted mostly of British
regular soldiers, but some provincial and ranger units provided support. Many of these soldiers
were not new to the conditions in North America, having had time to alter their training
techniques and tactics to match the French, which gave them a significant advantage to the
British Army of previous years.109
The French fighting forces at Quebec had a completely different experience preparing for
battle in 1759. Montcalm commanded a troupe de la marine force similar sized to Wolfe’s
army, but also five battalions of troupes de terre, a sizable native Canadian and militia force and
several parties of Native Americans.110 Natives were the chief culprits of French guerrilla
attacks during the siege of Quebec. This use of irregular tactics would prove to be the most
significant point of tension between Montcalm and Vaudreuil, who disagreed over the use of
irregular versus European tactics. This argument is often cited as Montcalm's downfall as a
commander in North America. Martin Nicolai attributes Montcalm's failure to his experience as
an officer and how he did not stay the course by using irregular warfare and challenged the
British in the open field. Montcalm had been experienced mostly with leading regular troops
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with old world tactics and utilized irregulars and natives in a harassing manner at Quebec.111
The French supplemented their forces widely by recruiting as many native warriors as possible.
Despite arguments, the French needed these natives and their irregular tactics to wage an
effective war against the British.112 Furthermore, Montcalm felt that if Quebec fell the war was
lost.113 Once the French learned of the coming British hostilities towards Quebec, they began
their preparations for their British guests. The tactical split did not affect much of the siege
because it was in almost entirely fought within the terms of Vaudreuil’s choice of war until the
final moments when these two forces met on the Plains of Abraham.
Quebec was a walled fortress city bordered by water on two sides, the south and east,
with cliffs along the St. Lawrence, making it reminiscent of European fortress cities, but the
French deemed such defenses insufficient.114 They built up their defenses with stockades in
critical strategic defense points around Quebec as well as new batteries to fend of the invading
British army. They set up trenches at the falls of Montmorency and prepared fire rafts to set
aflame enemy ships.115 Women, children, and non-essential personnel were sent away to safer
locations close to Quebec, while all men able to bear arms were mobilized to defend the city.116
Nonetheless, the residents of Quebec had become concerned for their lives and livelihoods once
the British invaders laid siege and built batteries with which to bombard the city.117 The people
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of Quebec prepared as much as they could regarding defenses, but their best defense would
prove to be the guerilla violence with which they met the British army.
June and July
The British expeditionary force of 8,500 regulars and provincial soldiers sailed out of
Louisburg on June 4th. On June 9th, the British expedition reached the mouth of the St Lawrence,
and by the 26th of June, Quebec hove in sight of the fleet.118 The British secured their landing at
the Ile d’Orleans with a vanguard force of rangers on June 27th. On the 29th, they crossed to the
south shore of the St. Lawrence across from Quebec to establish a base at Pointe-Levy.119 Later,
on July 8th, the British would establish another camp on the north shore of the St, Lawrence, just
east of the Montmorency River and Montcalm's base of operations at Beauport. The goal of the
British was to force the French to face them in open battle.120 The establishment of each camp
by the British met with resistance from French militia and their allied native warriors, making for
warfare with little restraint on the level of violence.
They British attempted a landing on the Isle d’Orleans opposite Quebec on the 26th.
Wolfe first dispatched a scouting party of rangers and light infantry in order to determine the
levels of resistance, nature of the defenses, and to find suitable areas for a general landing and
basecamp. These soldiers were met with some resistance and sustained casualties. Knox notes
that a lieutenant with forty rangers had engaged the enemy during their night landing on the 26th
and was forced to retreat to a farmhouse until the morning of the 27th. These rangers had one
casualty who was found "scalped and butchered in a very barbarous manner." The morning of
the 27th the British began their full landing without significant resistance.121 Six companies of
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rangers and one light infantry unit were dispatched to carry out the scouting of the Isle
d’Orleans.122 As the primary British landing force made their way onto the Isle d’Orleans
through the landing area at St. Laurent, a group encountered a grizzly message to the British as a
whole. A member of one of the ranging parties sent out by Wolfe on the 26th was used as a
warning to the British to cease their landings and return to where they came. Troops discovered
this “Ranger killed and scalped, and a stake drove through his body.”123 With this act, the French
and their native allies revealed themselves able and willing to use scalping and hyper violent
guerilla tactics to repel the British from their lands. From this point, the violence at Quebec
started immediately with scalpings and random attacks. These actions precipitated separate
responses by both British commanders and soldiers. British commanders condemned these
attacks as unjust and against the rules of war, whereas soldiers took matters into their own hands
and fought the war on the same terms of scalping and hyper-violence.
Wolfe had already prepared a manifesto to Canada on the subject of such tactics, but
these events gave it added gravity. Posted on the 28th before much of the British forces had
landed, this manifesto made a note of the previous atrocities the British believed the French
responsible for in the war.

The formidable sea and land armament which the people of Canada now behold
in the heart of their country is intended by the King, my master, to check the
insolence of France, to revenge the insults offered to the British colonies, and to
entirely deprive France of their most valuable settlement in North America … The
King of Great Britain wages no war with the industrious peasant, the sacred
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orders of religion, or the defenseless women and children; to these, in their
distressful circumstances, his royal clemency offers protection. The people may
remain unmolested on their lands, inhabit their houses, and enjoy their religion
insecurity … But if by a vain obstinacy and misguided valor they presume to
appear in arms, they must expect the most fatal consequences—their habitations
destroyed, their harvest utterly ruined and the only passage for relief stopped up
by a most formidable fleet.124

The British had a score to settle despite the mercy offered in his manifesto. Later in his
manifesto, Wolfe mentions the infractions committed against the British earlier in the war,
maintaining if the French taking up arms at Quebec, “the law of nations justify the waste of war,
as necessary to crush an ungenerous enemy.”125 Wolfe’s promise of a violent response to any
resistance would be realized as the months of July and August unfolded.
The Quarter Master Sergeant John Johnson provides a rank-and-file perspective of the
manifesto in his journals. It threatened all citizens tempted to take up arms against the British
with violence and cruelty. It also used strong language to describe the Canadian irregulars and
Natives condemning their use of scalping and skulking. Wolfe called French and native tactics
in the past savage and inhumane, warning they would answer them with ferocity if used against
British soldiers.126 Previous encounters with the French and their native allies undoubtedly
influenced its drafting, with Wolfe condemning their actions at Oswego and William Henry as

124

Wolfe, Life and letters of Wolfe, 439-440.
Wolfe, Life and letters of Wolfe, 440.
126
John Johnson was a Clerk and Quarter Master Sergeant for the 58th regiment and witnessed both the fall of
Quebec as well as the reduction of Canada. “Memoirs of the Siege of Quebec and Total Reduction of Canada in
1759 and 1760 By John Johnson,” in Arthur Doughty, ed., The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of
Abraham, Volume 5 (Quebec: Dussault & Proulx, 1901), 80.
125

41

against the “maxims of war.”127 Wolfe and his army invading Quebec saw themselves as
carrying out a just punishment, in the case of which the French did not cooperate with their
British counterparts. This prevailing British feeling toward the French explains the levels of
violence adopted seemingly at odds with international norms of warfare.
This manifesto also expressed a contemporary understanding of just warfare in 1759 on
an international level that would have come into play with officers in the British Army. Emerich
de Vattel’s Law of Nations, published in 1758, served as a precursor to international accords
signed in later centuries by Western nations and represented the general thinking of the time
regarding the proper conduct of war. The book’s importance to this study lies in its providing an
understanding of how Europeans sought to limit violence and fight a “just war” against their
enemies.128 Wolfe sending his manifesto to the leaders of Quebec falls in line with conducting a
just war against the French. He gave them what seemed to be a fair chance to stay out of
combat, but events on the ground almost immediately overtook the promise of fair treatment.
And as guerilla warfare reigned through July and into August, Wolfe’s willingness to exercise
mercy yielded to unlimited war.
Vattel outlined in Chapter eight of the “Rights of Nations” that levels of violence allowed
in war depended on the relationship between enemies. Vattel stated, “the enemy who attacks me
unjustly, gives me an undoubted right to repel his violence,” which could translate into an equal
or more significant action to ensure victory or survival. This did not include violence in what he
calls unjust actions. In addition, quarter or mercy must be given to capitulated enemies and any
force used must be only enough to ensure victory not torture of the enemy. A few loopholes
allowed generals and soldiers to exterminate enemies for the safety of their armies within the
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boundaries of how their men had been treated in captivity or in battle.129 One such exception
allowed soldiers not to give quarter to the enemy if they were guilty of an “enormous breach of
the law of nations, and particularly when he has violated the laws of war.” Furthermore, in this
scenario the “inhuman” enemy was to be treated as soldiers have been treated in previous
encounters.130 In the case of the siege and battle for Quebec 1759, the actions of the French and
their native allies at Oswego and Fort William Henry could be seen as just provocation for
similar treatment of them when prisoners.
Europeans conducted war in this fashion within a vacuum of 18th-century political
philosophy. The realities of North American warfare did not entirely accord with these ideals,
neither for natives, the French, nor the British. The attacks by French-allied natives on the
surrendered garrisons at Fort William Henry and Oswego prior to Quebec had angered the
British, which translated to little patience with international guidelines at Quebec and bloody
retribution for crimes. This mentality may have seemed unjust to European eyes, but in fact was
a part of the North American way of fighting a war. This unlimited warfare represented a
tradition of war that accepted blurring the lines between combatants and noncombatants.131 But
even within European norms, razing an enemy city or not giving quarter was allowed when the
enemy had violated the laws of war. In this context equal action against your enemy become
punishment, not a crime.132 Punishment to fit the “crimes” committed played out over the course
of July and August 1759, culminating with the battle on the Plains of Abraham and the departure
of petite guerre for European norms of warfare.
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Following taking control of the Isle d’Orleans at the end of June, the British army then
moved to take Point Levi, directly across from Quebec, where they met considerable resistance.
Upon landing at Levi, Hopson’s Grenadiers and the rangers accompanying them were attacked
immediately. The Day after landing, a “body of Canadians and Indians incommoded our troops
at Point Levi … their commander being kill’d, they dispersed.” The grenadiers sustained three
casualties in this encounter. These attacks occurred near daily for the British occupiers of Point
Levi and were met in kind.133 A group of Whitmore’s grenadiers on July 1st went on a simple
foraging party at Point Levi and were taken by surprise by French irregulars. Two men were
killed and scalped by the enemy.134 Throughout the campaign, soldiers who strayed out for food
or to go to the bathroom risked brutal attack by the enemy. Wolfe stressed in his orders during
July that soldiers should never travel or gather provisions alone, so as to prevent or curb guerilla
attacks by Canadians and natives.135 Where Wolfe pursued diplomacy to counteract these
attacks, British soldiers unilaterally took revenge with their own hands on the French and
natives.
The rangers with Monckton at Levi engaged the enemy on the 30th of June. Turning to
tactics generally scorned by the British as being savage in manner, these rangers killed and
scalped three of the enemy.136 As the source does not directly state that these enemy soldiers
were native, French militiamen or colonial troops could have fallen under the scalping knives of
rangers. The Highlander units at Levi also experienced action, the enemy almost completely
surrounding Thompson’s unit.137 Fraser's Highlanders took four French irregular soldiers’ lives
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in capturing the ground of Point Levi. However, Lieutenant Malcolm Fraser noted the morning
after this encounter finding two of Whitmore's soldiers killed and scalped on Orleans. Fraser
called the attack a “murder,” noting the bodies were “cruelly mangled" by natives allied with the
French. This provides a window into soldiers’ feelings towards the violence.138 This developing
violence was thus reciprocal: the French and natives attacked the British and the British attacked
the French with similar tactics. Between the first of July to the British landing at the
Montmorency on the 8th of July, the back and forth violence began to ramp up.
Wolfe most likely realized the state of warfare that his soldiers would face while he
planned his campaign against Quebec. He issued a general order forbidding scalping and
condemned the targeting of civilian or church property.139 British and French officials agreed
under a flag of truce on the 4th of July to curb the use of scalping, but combatants on both sides
paid little heed.140 These orders indicated a disconnection between the British officers at Quebec
and their soldiers, however. Wolfe attempted to curb his soldiers’ actions but to little effect as
enemy skulking parties continue to gall the men. The Generals could not or chose not to take
measures to control their soldiers fully, probably in order to maintain tactical pressure and to
ensure victory.
Wolfe resolved to establish a base on the north side of the St. Lawrence across the
Montmorency River from the French position at Beauport, in hopes of prodding Montcalm’s
forces into open battle. This move closer to the enemy enhanced the opportunity for scalping
and attacks. Any soldier or groups of soldiers who ventured out of the security of the rest of the
army was fair game for native and French-Canadian attacks. Captain Benoni Dank’s Rangers on
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July 9th skirmished with a group of natives at Montmorency. The report states that the British
“killed and wounded about thirty” and “three Indian scalps were taken from the enemy.”141 On
the 10th, Lieutenant Malcolm Fraser recounted in his journal that they skirmished and captured
prisoners, during which twelve of Captain John Gorham's Rangers were killed close to general
Townshend’s camp. Also, the day before this attack, a company of rangers was sent to the south
of the river to scout and engage the enemy. They took the one-man prisoner and two of his
children. Fraser recorded that the rangers “murdered“ the prisoners in a “most inhuman
manner,“ due to their fears that the children's screams would lead to their discovery by nearby
war parties. However, Fraser elucidated that the rangers boasted about these killings, which he
found surprising for people of European descent to fall to the “cowardice“ and “barbarity” of
North American natives.142 British soldiers and officers openly admitted to scalping natives in
the aftermath of the shift to Montmorency, evidence of retribution for the attacks natives carried
out against the British.
While these attacks continued throughout the month of July, the British managed to
sustain heavy artillery fire on the city of Quebec. This artillery did not hone in on only potential
military targets but also intended to terrorize the citizens into capitulating. On the 13th of July,
they managed to set fire to the upper town of Quebec. While not unheard of for warfare during
the 1700s, this shelling exemplifies the destruction wrought by the English against French
infrastructure during the siege. While British soldiers were being surprised and scalped, the
French people were losing their lives and livelihoods in the fires of Quebec.
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Fraser’s Highlanders had already proved their capability in their differing experiences in
Scotland and combat at Louisburg alongside their former enemy James Wolfe. On July 17th, the
Highlanders were attacked on the Montmorency side of the St. Lawrence, and five men were
killed and scalped.143 In an attempted retaliation for this event, a Canadian and his son were
captured in the wake of this incursion a few days later. In accordance with the way civilians were
treated when captured previously in the siege they should have been interrogated and then let go.
A witness to the event states: “one of our men fired at him, and notwithstanding his seeing it
impossible to escape, being surrounded by 100 men, he returned the fire and killed the
soldier…it was with great difficulty his life was suffered from the fury of the men.“ Officers, in
light of perceived higher morality, spared the man from their men. However, the soldiers’ “fury”
indicated that the desire for revenge outweighed finer sentiments among the rank-and-file.
Wolfe also sent out larger scouting parties to gather intelligence and harass the French
into submission, bringing those who resisted in as prisoners so as to send a stern message.144 On
July 21st, Wolfe dispatched soldiers under the command of Colonel Guy Carleton to Pointe-auxTrembles with this objective in mind. The landing party captured a number of women they
rounded up and kept on Admiral Saunders’s ship.145 Evidently, this caused turmoil among both
the French and one of Wolfe’s Brigadier Generals, George Townshend. General Montcalm
noted in his journal that Wolfe only took “the prettiest women” insinuating a salacious intent.146
However, other French sources stated that the prisoners were treated with complete respect and
were “quite happy” with their stay with the British.147 Most British officers noted how these
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prisoners were returned the next day under truce,148 making this relatively benign compared to
other actions by Wolfe and his soldiers. However, one witness of the siege notes that returning
these unscathed prisoners under a flag of truce so soon was a testament to British “lenity shown
to the enemy,” from which they “find little benefit accrue to us from them, they continue to scalp
every person who is unhappy enough to fall in their hands.”149
Wolfe continued with his plan to harass the enemy, with cattle being targeted for
extermination or capture and prisoners taken. This was unusual for European standards where
non-combatants were usually ignored or left alone during wartime incursions.150 Townshend,
despite growing tensions between himself and Wolfe, was ordered to send his soldiers to “take
up their ground” and carry out these orders.151 Knox recorded a number of these depredations
such as when the light infantry “brought in some cattle and plunder, also a man and boy, whom
they surprised … as they were fishing.”152 Knox also told of Colonel Fraser's detachment
bringing back “prisoners, with some of their effects and near three hundred black cattle, sheep
hogs, and horses.” Knox elaborated that this action accorded with the laws of nations compared
to the French who opted for “repeated barbarities.”153 Clemency to civilians was not the concern
of enlisted personnel more focused on exacting revenge and instilling terror, which would, in
turn, become Wolfe’s objective as well.
Terror and destruction were rampant in the constant skirmishes and attacks around
Quebec during July. Then late that month, rumors circulated amongst the ranks that three
captured Royal Americans were to be burned by French allied natives. As a result of this grizzly
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rumor, Wolfe accused the French General of playing the part of “an assassin … employing
Indians to pick off his sentries.”154 Wolfe (in a letter written for him by Isaac Barre) threatened
Vaudreuil that if the three soldiers were in fact burned alive, it would be met with “the severest
reprisals, all distinction will cease between Frenchmen, Canadians and Indians; all will be treated
as a cruel and barbarous mob thirsting for human blood.”155 This letter reveals the anger and
frustration Wolfe and his soldiers felt towards French action at Quebec and their conduct
throughout the war. Vaudreuil, in a letter written on his behalf by Louis Antoine de Bougainville,
quickly dismissed these reports of the Royal Americans as rumors intended to discredit the honor
of French forces. Bougainville cautioned Wolfe, “your excellency ought to have regarded as
soldiers’ gossip the proceeds related in the intercepted letter; the fate of those three prisoners has
been the same as that of all others taken by the Indians; the King has ransomed them out of their
hands at considerable expense.”156 Furthermore, Bougainville affirmed the historical record
reflected their “justification in the matter of the infraction of the capitulation of Fort William
Henry.”157 This exchange of comments, letters and threats illustrates the importance of the cycle
of violence to the campaign. Yes, officers such as Wolfe and Montcalm had roles in directing
their soldiers, but ultimately the actions of soldiers on the ground dictated what happened.
In light of the rumors of violence and the hard evidence of violence committed against
his men, Wolfe and his army started to intensify their violent measures against the people of
Quebec. From late July, the bombardment of the city increased and the civilian targets suffered
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more than they had earlier in the campaign.158 Wolfe expressed the British frustration with the
people of New France and their continued resistance against the invasion force of Quebec with a
second manifesto on July 25th, 1759, which read:

His Excellency, indignant at the little regard paid by the inhabitants of Canada to
his proclamation of the 29th of last month, is determined no longer to listen to the
sentiments of humanity which prompted him to solace people blind to their own
interests.
The Canadians have, by their conduct, proved themselves unworthy the
advantageous offers he held out to them. Wherefore he has issued orders to the
Commanders of his Light Infantry and other officers, to proceed into the country
and to seize and bring in the farmers and their cattle, and to destroy and lay waste
what they shall judge proper. As for the rest, as it is disagreeable to have recourse
to the barbarous extremities whereof the Canadians and Indians, their allies, have
given the example, he proposes to postpone until the 10th of August next, the
decision on the fate of the prisoners on whom he will use reprisals unless the
Canadians, in the meantime come and submit to the terms of the first
proclamation, and thereby excite his clemency and induce him to mildness.159

Wolfe lashed out at the people of Canada for their resistance and their continued use of guerrilla
tactics against his soldiers. The manifesto's promise to discontinue British attacks on the French
people should they give up resistance was never put to the test.
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These warnings from Wolfe had little effect on the operations of the French against the
British invasion. Seemingly, Wolfe had no intention of keeping to his ultimatum which was to
serve as a warning to non-combatants A day after his second manifesto he issued an order that
revised his orders from June forbidding scalping.160 Henceforth, his soldiers could make an
exception “when the enemy are Indians or dressed like Indians.”161 Wolfe probably felt that if
non-combatants were dressed as Indians they were in fact combatants with intention to mount
attacks on British soldiers. With this fateful late July order, the enemies of the British at Quebec
all became potential targets for scalping depending on what they chose to wear. Vaudrieul, for
his part, threatened to “give no quarter to officers or men that fall into his hands, if his Canadians
are ill-treated.”162
The scope for such violence widened after July 31st. General Wolfe, under criticism from
his brigadiers, decided upon an amphibious attack just west of the Montmorency Falls, by which
he hoped to secure a landing and provoke the French to leave their encampment at Beauport to
give battle.163 This would place them on the French flank with but the steep shoreline between.
Another detachment would join them from the camp east of the Montmorency by fording the
river’s mouth at low tide. This plan, originally set for the 30th of July, was delayed due to
weather and indecisive leadership. Because of these delays, the French were able to prepare for
the attack. Disorder and confusion prevailed because of difficulties landing and soldiers not
following orders. The main force tasked with taking the Montmorency beaches was the British
Grenadiers. The shock troops of their time, these soldiers were expected to maintain full
composure and professionalism in the most extreme combat. The grenadiers failed in that
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regard, letting a blind rage take over. Forgetting their general orders, they haphazardly stormed
the occupied upper shoreline, only to be repulsed, leading to British withdrawal.164 Wolfe in his
letters to William Pitt placed the blame on the grenadiers for the failure. However, he also
mentioned the enemy natives “murdering” his wounded soldiers and scalping the dead and alive
alike.165 Use of the term murder term insinuates that these killings and attacks fell outside the
expected killings of war.
The loss at the Montmorency cost the British approximately 400 fighting men.166 Many
of these casualties were wounded men left behind, taken prisoner and for whom the Frenchallied natives showed no mercy. James Thompson, present at the attack, affirmed the French sat
back as their Native allies flew to scalp the British who came to hand.167 Malcolm Fraser
witnessed “some men coming down from the trenches where some of our people lay killed; we
imagined they were Indians sent to scalp them.” The Quarter Master Sergeant John Johnson also
witnessed this slaughter, stating that the natives’ “chief thirst is after blood.” Furthermore, he
specifically pointed out that they performed these attacks within eyesight of the retreating British
soldiers and French commanders.168 In the view of the British, the French had let loose these
natives to terrorize the British. This would provide the justification the British would need in
their later actions towards the French throughout the month of August, which witnessed the sheer
brutalization that encounters between the French and the British could yield.
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Frustration and anger seized the British ranks in the aftermath of the Battle of
Montmorency. Men had suffered death, wounds, or exposure to extreme violence almost daily
and conducted their own retaliation against the French. The 31st marked a change in policy for
British officers and the interpretation of the rules of war would fall under the second manifesto
of July 25th. Wolfe now essentially supported letting his soldiers do what they wanted to French
combatants and noncombatants to ensure victory. The treatment of wounded soldiers at the
Montmorency nullified any mercy Wolfe’s men had for the French and the severity of action
mentioned in the manifesto was then implemented to its fullest.169 Despite how Ward and Stacey
have portrayed the siege of Quebec, this was not Wolfe or Montcalm’s war. The actions of
Wolfe at the end of July was merely to rein in his soldiers who had and would continue to act on
their own according to a battle plan of violent revenge.
August
General Wolfe had grown anxious for an open field battle with the French but could not bring it
to fruition. The failure at Montmorency and the constant attacks from natives and French
irregulars took a toll on his soldiers. General Townshend, one of Wolfe’s least supportive
brigadiers, wrote about the general’s choice to employ terror tactics to force the hand of the
French. “I have never served so disagreeable a campaign like this. Our unequal force has
reduced our operations to a scene of skirmishing, cruelty and devastation. It is a war of the worst
shape.”170 Although it seemed to shock Townshend, the previous two months at Quebec and the
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four years before that at war with the French in North America proved that the terror of
skirmishing, cruelty, and devastation had prevailed throughout.
The violence promised in both of Wolfe’s manifestos to Canada came to pass in August,
as soldiers in tandem with artillery destroyed much of the countryside. Parishes, churches and
civilian targets such as family houses and crops were among the cinders left behind by the
British. They took their general’s frustration as an open invitation to do more of what they were
doing all along and wreak havoc on the countryside.171 Civilians either directly or indirectly
involved in the fighting now fell under British muskets, cannons, and blades. The British
adopted some of the guerrilla tactics the French had employed against them to exact revenge for
previous atrocities.
The British rangers spearheaded this new official policy of devastation. They had been
the most exposed to the everyday attacks from natives and Canadians as they manned scouting
parties through the region. Naturally, they would have the most to repay to their enemies and
had the means with their assignments in August to “scour the country,” destroying all property,
food, and resistance, sparing only women, the elderly and children.172 Although the British army
had already been conducting their own operations in this manner, they had been restrained
because of possible backlash from officers. In August, however, they had little to no restraints
and were permitted to use every means necessary to bring victory. Wolfe’s late July order
allowing them to scalp any native or Canadian militiaman if dressed like natives had freed the
hands of British soldiers.173 Revenge was at hand.
Both sides practiced scalping widely during this time period, both in the land surrounding
Quebec and those areas to which Gorham’s Rangers and General Monkton’s Highlanders and
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light infantrymen were sent to lay waste.174 Militia and natives skulking in the forest often fired
upon British rangers and light infantrymen on their mission of destruction. David Perry recalled
a number of instances where they “burn[ed] and destroy[ed] everything” in their path. These
attacks would continue into September, even during the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.175 The
British conducted a reign of terror against the French, who took matters above and beyond the
accepted scope of war. This action must be understood in the context of what happened at the
Montmorency and their perceptions of the atrocity of William Henry. Furthermore, the constant
guerilla attacks that occurred throughout the events of the siege to this point influenced the level
of violence with which the British soldiers chose to attack the French and their allies.
Wolfe recorded in his journal on both August 2nd and 7th that “a detachment was sent out
to scour the country.”176 These entries would prove to be his last in his journal that remains
incomplete. On August 4th, Gorham’s Rangers were shipped to the north shore of the St.
Lawrence between La Petite Riviere and La Malbaie, several kilometers down the St. Lawrence
River from Quebec, with orders to destroy everything in their path on their return to camp.177
The Rangers had their work cut out for them as they travelled back up to meet the rest of the
army at Quebec, leaving the land behind them in ashes. On August 12th Gorham’s Rangers
entered the village of St. Paul.178 They skirmished with the enemy during that afternoon, “drove
them from their covering in the wood, and clear’d the village which they burnt, consisting of 50
fine houses and barns; destroyed most of their cattle.”179 These attacks targeted Canadians and
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their settlements rather than natives. Between this time and the 16th of September, these rangers
burned, ravaged and destroyed farms, property, and crops, killing those who resisted.
In tandem with British attacks on the settlements below Quebec, the British sought to
terrorize settlements upstream from the city. Wolfe Dispatched Brigadier General Murray with a
detachment of 1,200 men to destroy settlements, disrupt supply lines, and attack a small French
naval presence.180 French forces had repelled Murray on two occasions before he managed to
land on the south shore at St. Croix opposite of Point Aux Tremble. They engaged the enemy on
this shore a few times with considerable casualties. Four hundred of Murray’s soldiers were
attacked on the 13th of August and sustained casualties. In reciprocation for this attack, Murray
ordered that all of the houses east of their position to be set on fire. Also, a manifesto was fixed
to a church at St. Croix that promised if hostilities continued “no quarter will be given [to] the
inhabitants when taken.”181 The threat of retaliatory violence against civilians falls in line with
much of the conflict already seen at Quebec. When seven marines from Murray’s detachment
were ambushed and “massacred and left on the beach in order to be discovered,”182 this sparked
much outrage amongst the ranks. In retaliation, civilian properties all around their operations,
about three miles east of St. Nicholas, were set on fire to retaliate against French “cruelty.”183
With reports of the attacks of Murray’s group spreading through British lines, soldiers on the
Montmorency side and Point Orleans followed suit with the destruction of civilian property and
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habitations.184 These destructive raids leveled most of the habitations and almost guaranteed that
people in Quebec would starve for the winter months as cattle and farmland were destroyed.185
While Gorham ravaged the settlements of Quebec and Murray mounted his attacks
upriver, a fateful incident of violence occurred at Saint Joachim and Sainte-Anne-de-Beaupré
across from Ilse d’Orleans east of Quebec City marking the culmination of the guerrilla warfare.
On the 10th of August, Wolfe received intelligence of militia activity at this strategic position
where a French priest led locals in resistance to the British. Wolfe sent a detachment of 70
Royal Americans to investigate and quell these attacks at St. Joachim. Immediately upon their
arrival they were fired upon, wounding four grenadiers, and retreated because of this heavy
resistance.186 This forced Wolfe to send a more considerable force, a detachment of 150 men
from the Highland regiments, to St. Joachim on August 17th. They managed to hold their
position in the town as the enemy retreated to a position adjacent to St. Joachim. The
Highlanders held their position in the French Priest’s house until the 22nd when Wolfe sent a
final detachment of light infantry and Rangers, led by Captain Alexander Montgomery, to
support the Highlanders.187 What happened must be understood in the context set of the style of
warfare pursued by common soldiers during the siege and not solely Wolfe’s loosening of the
rules on scalping in late July and campaign of devastation in August.
On the 23rd, the Rangers and Light Infantrymen fought and defeated the militia. David
Perry recalls that their standing orders were to “kill all and give no quarters.”188 The
Highlanders, Rangers and light infantry, held the surrendered French militiamen but Captain
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Montgomery ordered the prisoners to be killed, the French priest among them.189 Fraser
recounted this event with scorn and disgust:
There were several of the enemy killed, and wounded, and a few prisoners were
taken, all of whom the barbarous Captain Montgomery, who commands us,
ordered to be butchered in a most inhuman and cruel manner; particularly two
[who [sic] I sent prisoners by a sergeant, after giving them quarter, and engaging
that they should not be killed, were one shot, and the other knocked down with a
tomahawk (a little hatchet) and both scalped in my absence, by the rascally
sergeant neglecting to acquaint Montgomery that I wanted them saved.
Despite Fraser’s promise of mercy Fraser’s attempts, Montgomery superseded his order and the
soldiers willingly killed the prisoners.190 Interestingly, regular British soldiers relatively new to
North American warfare led this incident. British regular soldiers in tandem with rangers and
Highlanders killing a priest marks a departure from regular army practices and proves that some
embraced the North American guerilla tactics, utilizing scalping and the killing of prisoners as a
means of revenge.
British officers and enlisted men held polarized views over this event. Wolfe did not
condone these actions according to Thompson’s testimony.191 Montgomery likely acted on his
own because of personal experience: his brother recently had been killed in the war and had his
body “cruelly mangled by Canadians.”192 Montgomery succumbed to a primal reaction against
the French and abused his power to exact revenge. In this desire for revenge, he hewed closer to
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enlisted men than to the officer class. The killing of the priest illustrated how soldiers dominated
the direction of the siege. Perry, who recalled of the priest’s killing that they “deliberately blew
his brains out,” expressed no remorse.193 Some officers shared this opinion. Townshend reports
on the incident with no concern194 A journal entry from a gentleman witness of the events at
Quebec, although not of the incident itself, stated that the priest and his companions were killed
in “return for many acts of cruelty.”195 A revenge narrative had essentially taken over the war,
one powered by the events that occurred at Oswego, Fort William Henry, and countless native
incursions on American settlements. The British saw themselves no longer as just an invasion
force, but as a force of reckoning and punishment. The French, of course, expressed outrage at
the killing. Montcalm had received reports of what had transpired at the village and asserted that
the priest had been “so mutilated” that it was difficult to identify the corpse of the clergyman.196
An officer characterized the killing of the priest, his companions and the destruction of the parish
as an “inhuman” act and affirmed natives to be “less cruel” than the British soldiers
responsible.197
This incident and the cruelty and destruction conducted with the oversight of Wolfe,
however, must be understood in the context of the rules and common sentiments of war in 1759.
Whether the killing of the priest and prisoners was justified can be argued from the different
perspectives of international law or of British common soldiers, British officers, and the French.
Matthew Ward argues that the killing of the priest and the actions Wolfe took in the war were not
justified within the parameters of international law of the time. Using Vattel as a guide, he
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deems Wolfe’s actions during late-July and August to be uncalled for and not bound by military
necessity alone. The indictment Ward makes is not isolated to any specific event such as the
killing of the priest, but the entirety of the operation. The destruction of civilian houses and
noncombatant property did not accord with Vattel’s rules of punishment, he maintains, but
“vengeance.” Ward states, “The raids Wolfe authorized went much farther than the destruction
of stores and supplies, and military necessity alone cannot explain or justify the ways in which
these raids were conducted.”198 Furthermore, Ward interprets Wolfe captured of women and
children at Point Aux-Trembles as unjust and blatant mistreatment of civilians, even though
these civilians were returned within a 24-hour period unscathed.199 Although vengeance may be
an accurate characterization of British actions, responsibility must be delegated to the right
perpetrators. Wolfe and his men operated on two different levels of legality and understanding
of a just war. Moreover, a closer look at Vattel’s work undermines Ward’s accusations and
provides some justification for Wolfe and his men.
Destruction of property, civilian and military, must be judged not by modern concepts but
in line with the thinking of 18th-century soldiers and lawmakers. Wolfe sent out rangers to root
out resistance in the countryside. These rangers would then later in August be a part of the
burning of towns from their landings to the final moments of the siege and battle. Ward
understands this as Wolfe overstepping the legal boundaries of just war.200 However, Vattel
allowed for such destruction under certain conditions. Vattel affirmed that when “a country is
totally ravaged, towns and villages are sacked and delivered up a prey to fire and sword,” this is
to be met with “chastising an unjust and barbarous nation of checking her brutality.”201
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Essentially, according to Vattel, countries may treat their enemy with an eye-for-an-eye
mentality of correctional violence. Wolfe and his men sought to keep the French in check in light
of their own attacks on British outposts, forts, and civilian property throughout the war.
The killing of the priest and his parishioners by Montgomery and his men similarly
initially seems illegal according to Vattel’s principles, but significantly, the lawyer does allow
for such actions under certain conditions. Vattel states specifically “quarter is to be given to
those who lay down their arms.”202 However, he continued, where “as a prince or general has a
right to sacrifice his enemies’ lives to his own safety and that of his men,- it appears, that, if he
has to do with an inhuman enemy who frequently commits such enormities, he is authorized to
refuse quarter … and to treat them as his people have been treated.”203 The British landed at
Quebec to find harsh resistance and a deceased ranger on a stake.204 In addition to the day-to-day
violence, scalpings and attacks, wounded British were completely mistreated by French at the
landings at the Montmorency falls. The French resistance at St. Joachim provided the last bit of
evidence that allowed British soldiers and Wolfe to actually justify their actions in an
international setting. Vattel’s principles of punishment then do seem to offer support for Wolfe’s
policies at Quebec that shifted towards violence and destruction following Montmorency and the
events of late July. Furthermore, what happened at the massacres of Oswego and Fort William
Henry, among other incidents, essentially provided Wolfe and his men the legal justification to
allow for the killing and scalping of French prisoners including a priest.
The month of August closed with the British forces mobilizing for their final push to take
the city of Quebec, during which both sides pursued the same guerilla actions. The British
Rangers and Highlanders were continued targeting towns and villages surrounding Quebec.
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Gorham’s rangers were entrusted with continuing the policy of destruction from the end of the
month to the final moments of the siege. On August 30th Gorham was sent with a detachment of
200 men to the south shore of Quebec to “burn and destroy the country.”205 The soldiers did not
spare any crops, livestock, or surrounding buildings and likely produced civilian casualties as
well. This destruction continued until the final battle on the Plains of Abraham.
The final act of violence took the form of European style battle on the Plains of Abraham.
Wolfe received what he had hoped for when landing at Quebec: a chance to face the French on
the open field utilizing regular tactics. This was a departure from the war his army had seen for
the past few months. The battle ended with a British victory and the deaths of both Montcalm
and Wolfe. The episode was quite typical of a European battle with two opposing columns of
soldiers taking turns firing flintlock muskets at each other. Along with musket and cannon fire,
ranging soldiers on the outside acted as snipers.206 One highlight of the battle directly referenced
the guerilla conflict, however. The Highland regiments, victims of many French and Indian
attacks, had a reputation of being fierce warriors. As the French retreated to the walls of Quebec
from their embarrassing defeat, Highlanders saw an opportunity for revenge and took it to
unleash the fury that had been building up since their arrival on June. Rather than reveling in the
defeat of the French and tending to their wounded, these soldiers in berserker-like state
unsheathed their broadswords and pursued the enemy.207 The highlanders chased the French,
hacking at their backs as they fled in fear. This scene attests to what war can do to the psyche of
soldiers.
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French officers who were captured by the British pled for the lives and quarter. Knox
recalls that they were “extremely apprehensive of being rigorously treated; for, conscious of their
inhuman behavior to our troops upon a former occasion,” they declared “they were not at Fort
William Henry in the year 1757.”208 Their being taken prisoner without incident marked the end
of the hyper violence at Quebec, but the devil’s work had already been done. A soldier affirmed
of that summer, “we burned and destroyed upwards of 1400 fine farm-houses, for we, during the
siege were masters of a great part of their country.” The same soldier said that Quebec would
take “half a century to recover the damage.”209 This half a century of damage ran deeper than
the wounds and destruction of property, but some soldiers would have experienced immediate
psychological damage as a result of the violence in the Siege of Quebec 1759.
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Chapter 5
Why Such Violence?

From June to September 1759, the British army maintained a siege characterized by guerilla
warfare that likely had adverse mental effects on its soldiers. Applying modern research on
combat psychological trauma and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) to 18th century warfare
presents evidential problems that cannot be fully rectified, making it impossible to know whether
combatants in the Seven Years’ War suffered such trauma. However, the existing records allows
the historian to track the actions of soldiers and from this to determine whether these actions
reflect symptoms of the disorder; and, further, whether combat psychological trauma and PTSD
may have played a role in the escalation of violence at Quebec. Combat in the American theatre
in the Seven Years’ War often took the form of guerilla tactics meant to inspire terror and dread
in the enemy, similar in ways to the Vietnam War, which brought PTSD to light as a recognized
condition. Although interpreting events centuries before modern conflict and modern medicine
has its limitations, one could argue that human revulsion to killing, in particular killing involving
body mutilation or dismemberment, remains constant. Inferences can be drawn from modern
warfare and its subsequent psychological disorders in order to understand the brutalization of
warfare that occurred during the Siege of Quebec and the Seven Years’ War as a whole.
Being exposed to extreme violence and killing costs the psyche of any human a
substantial price. The DSM-IV states that PTSD can occur in a person almost immediately after
a traumatic event, a classification that could be applied to many of the violent incidents
experienced by soldiers in active combat during the Seven Years’ War.210 A study of the Second
World War determined that after 60 days of continuous combat (being continuously exposed to
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gunfire, skirmishes, and killing), 98 percent of soldiers that survived the fighting would suffer
from some sort of psychological disorder.211 The Siege of Quebec lasted three months, with
soldiers serving throughout the campaign exposed to the constant threat of native raids and
skirmishes with the enemy. This suggests that the soldiery at Quebec could have experienced a
similar mental toll.
Certain factors may have worked to blunt the psychological trauma. Conceiving of the
mindset of the military as a group rather than as of individual can shed light on soldiers
committing acts of violence and killing during the siege without experiencing any sense of
second-guessing or remorse immediately after the event. Grossman calls this “group
absolution,” where soldiers freely commit acts of killing violence or destruction with anonymity
amongst a group of other perpetrators.212 Foot soldiers also operated within a hierarchy of ranked
authority that blunted any individual sense of guilt. The power of an officer was a critical factor
in forcing soldiers to preform their duty in the workplace or battlefield, which in many cases
include acts of violence or killing. Furthermore, Grossman writes four “authority factors” that
hardens the relationship between the killer and those who give the order to kill. The most
important of which are the legitimacy of an authority figure’s demands and the intensity of these
demands. The legitimacy of authority figures within the military operated to strip soldiers of free
will.213 Military discipline during the Seven Years’ War was quite harsh and unforgiving, with
offenses meriting both corporal and capital punishment. These punishments were also
administered in public, which legitimized an officer’s authority and that of the military
enterprise. People who deserted would often receive upwards of a thousand lashes or public
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execution administered by the hand of authority.214 The violence of the Siege of Quebec must be
placed into this context with the rest of the war. Violence and killing did not happen in a
vacuum but was a critical part of military life in which a soldier followed orders or suffered
grievously. Throughout the campaign the British leaders promoted violence. Wolfe’s
manifestos, his scouring parties, the campaign of destruction and his order on scalping all
provided the necessary literature that further enabled the violence that was already ensuing. The
combination of the authoritarian power structure, group psychology, and harsh discipline in the
military conditioned men to violence and killing, but it came at a cost.
Shay argues that moral order or “Themis” hangs on a balance of a commander’s abilities
and what soldiers witness on the battlefield. Shay sums up these aspects as the amenities that
allow for massacre to occur in war.215 The best example of this is the killing and scalping of the
priest in August 1759. The orders “kill all and give no quarter” along with the standing orders in
August that allowed for the use of scalping only on people dressed as natives were taken to
brutal extremes.216 Group absolution, the military institution and the breakdown of morality
affected the army collectively. A number of soldiers in both the Highlanders and Rangers were
witness to this cruel event but chose to do nothing and allowed it to happen. Furthermore,
commanders broke the legal and military barriers that would normally prevent or hamper
massacres like this from happening. This is all attributed to a group psychological process that is
involved with the brutalization of war.
At the same time, soldiers acted violently on their own with little guidance from
authorities in a fashion best explained by a violent thirst for revenge on the French and natives.
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The longer soldiers are exposed to combat, the more they are likely to be affected and show
symptoms of disorder.217 The constant skirmishing and ambushes the British invasion force
dealt with created the conditions for these psychological disorders. As demonstrated above, the
French and their Native allies conducted a guerilla war that took the lives of many British regular
soldiers and irregular soldiers. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder can manifest in numerous
different ways from similar situations. Veterans of the Vietnam War often suffered from some
of the most severe, violent symptoms because of the “hyper vigilance” created by a guerilla
conflict. The lynchpin of symptoms is the effects of traumatic events experienced outside of the
usual experience of the individual.218 Two soldiers posted on sentry duty at Quebec were startled
to the point of discharging his weapon into the dark forest line at no particular target. They were
then sentenced by the Colonel to serve their next sentry duty dressed as women.219 While this
case may seem interesting and embarrassing for the chap dressed as a woman, it reveals the
immense pressures to which soldiers were subjected. These soldiers discharging their weapons
due to fear may indicate “hyper vigilance” in light of the constant attacks from French guerillas
and the general nature of the conflict, suggesting a form of PTSD or mental breakdown.
Actions borne out of fear are quite relatable if one tries to comprehend battle through the
eyes of soldiers. This excuses the explosive, violent reactions, such as following retreating
soldiers swinging a claymore at their backs. These reactions can happen well after a soldier’s
service, or in many cases during a conflict.220 The killing of the priest could be seen as occurring
within the framework of group absolution about which Grossman wrote, but it can also be
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attributed to this heightened use of violence and explosive reaction. The Highlanders and
Rangers present at the attack included soldiers who had witnessed horrifying events
beforehand.221 The violence resulted not only from a desire for revenge for past atrocities
conducted by the French and their native allies, but also, possibly, from a deeper psychological
affliction resulting from the excessive violence of the siege.
PTSD and other neuroses stem from the stressful situations soldiers are forced to endure
on a daily basis. Historians often understand PTSD and other neuroses in purely academic terms
rather than as lived by soldiers. Facing danger or witnessing brutality spawns chemical reactions
in the brain related to primal instincts such as “fight or flight” in people. Prolonged exposure to
such visceral threat can cause a re-wiring of the brain physiologically.222 Soldiers in the Seven
Years’ War were affected by these simple biological functions to danger and stress just as
soldiers in the 20th century. The violence in Quebec was in part directed by General Wolfe and
his Brigadiers, but as primarily perpetuated by enlisted soldiers and lower ranking officers doing
the fighting. Psychological trauma can lead to soldiers shutting down, as did the two sentries
who fired their weapons into the dark at an imagined enemy. Or it can breed hyper-violence
among those affected, as evident among Highlander soldiers at the end of the Battle on the Plains
of Abraham.223 Soldiers acting in this fashion match Shay’s description of the “berserker.”
The DSM IV states that a symptom of PTSD is the “persistent symptoms of increased
arousal (not present before the trauma) as indicated by irritability or outbursts of anger, difficulty
concentrating, hyper vigilance and exaggerated startle response.”224 The exaggerated startled
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response and the presence of violent angry outbursts are the important symptoms to note when
studying the actions of the soldiers who fought during the Siege of Quebec. This is the
contradictory part of the definition of PTSD that does not exactly paint a picture of how these
symptoms manifest themselves within the context of a battle. These symptoms are hard to
identify in living examples let alone people who have been dead for centuries. However,
documenting violence over a course of years and in the few months that the Siege of Quebec
occurred, it is quite possible that some if not all of these soldiers suffered from PTSD.
Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam deals specifically with the mental state a soldier finds himself
in during a time of heightened stress in battle. He wrote of the berserker state observed in the
Vietnam War, which drove soldiers to perform terrible feats in battle. Soldiers experienced a
total loss of emotion or morality, where killing and violence was an outlet to relieve the
pressures of war. A justification for many of these soldiers’ actions is the saying “don’t get mad,
get even.”225 This resonates with the entirety of the Siege of Quebec as an entity. Personally and
collectively British soldiers seemed to work on this revenge protocol. The escalation of violence
in August was in direct relation to the constant attacks and scalping of British soldiers besieging
Quebec. Furthermore, the “massacres” at Fort William Henry and Oswego also were at the
forefront of soldiers’ minds when facing a surrendered soldier or a civilian village. The instance
in which Captain Montgomery’s soldiers killed and scalped the priest along with a number of
prisoners can serve as a critical example of this. They had all the justification needed to execute
these soldiers. First of these reasons, the long history with the French breaking the rules of war
and increasing violence. Second, Wolfe opened up the rules that forbid scalping, which gave
them free reign to scalp and execute within the wording of his orders. Last, these soldiers saw
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constant violence and destruction during their time at Quebec that in many cases probably
precipitated this violent response because of underlying trauma.
The nature of the Seven Years’ War in North America allowed for much more hand to
hand combat than what was seen in 20th century conflicts. Harvey Schwartz states that
witnessing constant violence and slaughter of people has a significant impact on the human
psyche. Veterans of the Vietnam War displayed these symptoms and often had the urge to
perform violent acts.226 Similarly, British soldiers at Quebec fought in a brutal guerilla conflict
where the enemy was often not clearly identified or visible, all the while being exposed to
constant enemy attacks. If soldiers who fought in the Vietnam War show symptoms of PTSD
from such conditions, it is more than likely soldiers fighting at Quebec would likewise. This in
turn would explain the father and son being executed, the extreme violence utilized by Ranger
and Highland corps, and the incident with the priest.
Gorham’s rangers laying waste to the Quebec countryside and the killing of the priest and
can be compared to the devastation and killing of prisoners and noncombatants that happened in
the Vietnam War. Wolfe gave his orders allowing for soldiers to lay waste to Quebec as well as
allowing them to utilize unruly tactics such as scalping to people who “dressed as Indians.”227
The My Lai massacre, where American soldiers killed Vietnamese innocents and razed the
village by the agency of enlisted soldiers. The massacre of the village occurred within the
confines of American policies but was set out by the initiative of the soldiers who committed the
atrocity. The soldiers were conditioned to “kill everything” and did not question these orders for
the people they were killing were no longer considered humans, but dehumanized to a status akin
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to “gooks.”228 The parameters set by American officials were the infamous body count or quotas
set to ensure a victory in the southeast nation. Villages and innocents were killed by American
soldiers on any sort of evidence of being guerilla soldiers or aiding and embedding the enemy.229
To an extent, My Lai and Saint Joachim both show how the nature of guerilla warfare breeds
violence and psychological trauma that gives birth to more violence.
The Siege of Quebec did not witness a gradual increase of violence as time progressed
from June to September. The bar for hyper-violence was set with the initial contacts between the
defending French forces and the invading British forces. The British were exposed to both
native combat tactics and the tactics utilized by European armies to create a unique type of
warfare not seen before by many British military personnel.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Wolfe and Montcalm died in the heat of battle and stole the true story of the Siege and
Battle for Quebec. Their deaths and the Plains of Abraham overshadowed the events in the three
months prior to that fateful confrontation. The Siege of Quebec was a clash between two titans
in a war that illustrated a cycle of violence that culminated with the war changing from hyperviolence and guerilla tactics to a classic European style confrontation. This essay focused on the
violence in this confrontation and demonstrates that this violence occurred as a process.
Military historians tend to interpret violence in combat as natural, an essential function of
warfare, normalizing killing without fully examining its meaning in other than military terms.
This essay attempts to demonstrate that the evidence of human destruction in war, including that
of the Seven Years’ War, completely undermines such a framing. By looking at the Siege of
Quebec and the exact events that unfolded over the course of a few months, it can be seen that
the guerilla warfare waged inflected psychological damage on many soldiers. A North American
way of war learned from native peoples fused with European models of total war to produce
conflict between the French and their indigenous allies on the one hand and the British troops on
the other. This led to a brutalization of the conflict and an escalation in the use of hyper-violent
tactics with the local Canadian inhabitants being the chief victims.
The historical interpretations written about the Seven Years’ War and specifically on the
Siege of Quebec often provide fruitful resources on the story of the war and how events
unfolded. In a simplistic manner battles were won or lost, people were killed and politics ran
throughout all of this. However, the blood and gore synonymous are undervalued and treated in
tactical terms rather than as having underlying social or psychological attributes. Historians of
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20th century conflicts such as the First World War or the Vietnam War have confronted the role
violence plays on the soldier’s performance and psyche. This essay demonstrates that the
soldiers who fought at Quebec saw horrific events and reacted to them in many of the same ways
as did soldiers in modern times, seen particularly in the quick adaptation of North American
guerilla tactics by British regular troops. While such tactics fell outside European norms of
warfare, they certainly accorded with the armed conflict waged in the colonies for a century. The
violence that occurred at the siege of Quebec, however, was amplified due to the number of
atrocities that had taken place during the war. For British soldiers, Oswego and William Henry in
particular, sparked an urge to exact revenge on their own violent terms. The French staged a
guerilla war with their native allies against the British expeditionary force. From the very first
landing, where a deceased soldier was found on the beaches with a stake driven through his
body, to the night before the battle on the plains British soldiers were often ambushed, killed and
scalped.
A revenge narrative is definitely present within some units and individuals who
experienced or were privy to what happened at previous battles such as the Fort William Henry
massacre. These soldiers exacted their revenge by embracing more violent tactics including
scalping and the killing of civilians prisoners. Such was the case with Gorham’s rangers laying
waste to the countryside and Captain Montgomery’s troops denying quarter to prisoners. On the
ground this had a profound effect on the psyche and performance of soldiers. British
commanders, such as Wolfe during the siege of Quebec, took advantage of this and channeled
the group rage to exact revenge for previous losses and to gain ground against the French. This
does not mean they were in full control, as the common soldiers set the agenda of violence
during the Siege. Commanders like General Wolfe merely reacted whereas the men led.
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Although it is impossible to definitively diagnose PTSD or combat trauma in soldiers that have
been dead for centuries, evidence from the Siege of Quebec suggest this could possibly be the
case for many British soldiers. Educated inferences can be made from applying modern research
to the events that transpired from June to August 1759. Nor did the hyper-violence at Quebec
stand alone in the Seven Years’ War.
Not too long after the fall of Quebec in September 1759, Robert Rogers’ Rangers
committed a massacre of the Abenaki village of St. Francis. As the Siege of Quebec was
commencing in July 1759, Robert Rogers was briefed about his own undertaking against the
French. A number of soldiers were on a diplomatic mission to the French allied Natives of St.
Francis and were taken prisoner. General Amherst ordered Rogers, ironically on the same day as
the Battle on the Plains of Abraham, to go to this village and attack it. Amherst specifically
notes:

Remember the barbarities that have been committed by the enemy’s Indian
scoundrels on every occasion, where they had an opportunity of shewing their
infamous cruelties on the King’s subjects, which they have done without mercy.
Take your revenge, but don’t forget tho’ those villains have dastardly and
promiscuously murdered the women and children of all ages.230
Although Fort William Henry was not noted specifically, it is implied among other instances that
were to be avenged by this attack. These orders are reminiscent of the pamphlet and embody
what the British sought to bring to the French to restore balance with violence. As the British
turned the tide of war against the French they intended to not heed to usual military courtesies or
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lawful practices, but inflict pain and loss in the name of vengeance. Furthermore, the British
continued to target native villages and people for their atrocities through to the end of the war.
This illustrates that the events at Quebec were not unique and illustrate a deeper meaning to the
Seven Years’ War and violence in war.
Historians too often tend to retell the fall of Quebec, the linchpin in the conquest of
Canada, in terms of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. This study has documented that this
battle merely capped a months’ long struggle characterized by guerilla tactics spurred by a desire
for revenge, making for violent conflict that could not but cause psychological trauma to many of
those involved. Taking account of such brutality and the bloody harvest it yields strips warfare
of its mystery and reveals combat for what it really is: killing.
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